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Introduction 
 
In December, 1970, the Boston Globe published Deckle McLean‟s article, “What is a 
court? An anatomy of the judicial system at the municipal level.” McLean explained that Boston 
had eight municipal courts, including the Boston Municipal Court for Old Boston, and the 
Suffolk County District Courts for the rest, in areas such as East Boston, Dorchester, Roxbury, 
and Brighton, each with its own distinct problems and solutions. He gave a brief caricature of a 
district court judge‟s attitude when assigning counsel for indigent defendants: “You are charged 
with low class. But I cannot accept a plea of guilty, this being America (or Russia). I will appoint 
counsel to represent you. (Sotto voce) Of course, we all know how it will turn out.”1 As 
pernicious as McLean‟s parody seemed, the reality of the justice system before the legal services 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s was far more unpleasant for the poor defendant. Only 
relatively recently in this nation‟s history was the right to counsel, embodied in the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, interpreted as conveying a duty upon the government to 
fund the legal defense of those who could not afford it. Not until the Supreme Court‟s decision 
Gideon v. Wainwright
2
 in 1963 were the state courts required to provide an attorney to anyone 
accused of a serious crime, at the states‟ expense. While it may seem obvious today that few 
criminal defendants, or civil litigants, stand a fair chance of succeeding in their cases without the 
advice of counsel, the battle to ensure that everyone had that same advantage in our courts was 
long, contentious, and has continued to the present. 
                                                 
1
 Deckle McLean, “What is a court? An anatomy of the judicial system at the municipal level,” Boston Globe, 
December 6, 1970. http://www.proquest.com/. It should be noted that McLean moderated his stance here in favor of 
a more realistic view of the functioning of district courts. 
2
 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 337 (1963). 
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 Boston is perhaps the best case study of how the mandate of Gideon, as well as that of the 
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts‟ highest state court, played out at the city level, where 
the majority of cases are heard, and where representation for indigents is most needed. The legal 
services movement found an apt home in Massachusetts‟ capital, where a tradition of providing 
legal services to the poor was already a part of the history and culture. This movement, which 
focused on expanding the access of indigents to both criminal and civil legal counsel at the state 
and federal court levels, was in many ways bound up with the civil rights movement, but also 
remained separate. It was both a national and local phenomenon, charged with race, religion, 
emotion, class, poverty, patriotism, politics, federalism, legal interpretation, and social change. 
In a moment that captured the tangled relationship between federal intervention and local energy, 
former U.S. Attorney General Elliot Richardson, a Bostonian most famous for his resignation 
and refusal to fire special prosecutor Archibald Cox at the behest of President Richard Nixon, 
who was being investigated in connection with the Watergate scandal, addressed a gathering of 
the Boston Legal Aid Society in January, 1974. He proclaimed: 
[I]t is certainly clear that we are at a stage in our society where the need for the 
representation of people who do not have the means ordinarily of employing or  
paying for legal services, is more necessary than it has ever been before. Our  
government has grown in intrusiveness and pervasiveness as a result of all kinds  
of demands on and expectations for the ability to solve problems, and regardless of  
one's political philosophy that evolution, with possible variances in degree, was  
virtually bound to take place.
3
 
 
Richardson‟s declaration of the terms of the modern legal environment to the Boston Legal Aid 
Society mirrored the relation between the federal government and the state of Massachusetts and 
the city of Boston. Just as Richardson, a nationally famous figure, announced to the Boston 
Legal Aid Society the mission of the legal services movement, so did Supreme Court Justice 
                                                 
3
 “Boston Legal Aid Society, Annual Meeting January 23, 1974 at New England Aquarium, Excerpts of the 
Proceedings and talk by Elliot L. Richardson, Esquire,” Boston Bar Journal 18, no. 23 (1974): 29, 
http://heinonline.org. 
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Hugo Black inform the local governments of the necessity of legal counsel for indigent 
defendants, without providing any mechanism or funding for its implementation. Neither 
Richardson nor Black had answers for the defendants in Dorchester District Court who felt as 
though McLean‟s impression of the judge was spot-on, nor for the underpaid counsel who often 
lacked the time and skills to competently represent their clients, nor for the state and county 
governments that had no clue where funding for these attorneys would come from. Local bar 
associations could only do so much, and government financing at every level would become 
necessary. 
 The story of criminal and civil legal services for the indigent has remained one of funding 
from the beginning. Indeed, while the discourse regarding the right to counsel in Boston would 
often dominate national politics and Supreme Court doctrine, it was financing from the federal 
government that really had the final say. County and state governments bore the brunt of 
Gideon‟s budgetary implications, but without significant funds from the federal government, 
representation for indigents on a wide-scale in Boston would have been impossible. The 
interplay between Congress, the White House, the state and county legislatures, the Supreme 
Judicial Court, and the myriad private organizations and stake-holders, is thus critical to 
understanding how the legal services movement progressed to the point where knowledge of the 
right to an attorney is now nearly ubiquitous in the public mind, and to knowing why the system 
is still failing. 
 Most importantly, the events in Boston between 1963 and 1983 provide legal services 
advocates with a broad display of both successful and ineffective solutions to the problem of 
providing high quality services to those who cannot pay for them. The right to counsel does not 
exist in a vacuum, but has practical and political consequences that evoke both fears of helping 
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criminals and how dearly we value civil liberties in the United States. While few doubted that the 
responsibility to protect the accused would eventually lie with the state, the participation of the 
private bar has always been a necessary, if at times unwilling, component. This period also 
demonstrated how such a movement, which began with grassroots reformers well before the 
Supreme Court made its decision in 1963, could change societal standards and practices without 
legislation, as the Boston Bar Association became a leader for the rights of the city‟s accused, 
and of the poor to access to routine civil legal procedures that formerly belonged solely to those 
with sufficient funds. Above all else, the legal services movement in Boston was a modern 
response to an age-old and formerly unrecognized problem, exacerbated by the complexity of 
life in 20th century United States society. 
A Note on Methodology 
 This thesis relies predominantly on primary sources: articles from the archives of the 
Boston Bar Journal. While this could possibly skew the historical record in favor of the Boston 
Bar Association, perhaps magnifying its role beyond proportion, every effort has been made to 
identify and document the real motivations and nature of the Association‟s actions. In addition, it 
was members of the Boston Bar who came to call loudest for reform, and to implement direct 
measures when those calls went unmet. The Journal still gives us the best record of the legal 
scene in Boston during this time period, as those who were most concerned with legal services 
were often Bar members. 
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Chapter One 
The Right to Counsel: the National Context 
 
Massachusetts‟ record as a pioneer in providing counsel for indigent defendants may be 
exceptional and lengthy, but the national context was critical to the development of today‟s legal 
services structure in every state. While the states would have to furnish their own methods of 
providing such legal services, it was the federal court system that forced the states to implement 
these programs in the first place. This is a top-down history. The events that unfolded at the 
federal level are crucial to understanding the right to counsel in the state of Massachusetts, and in 
city of Boston. 
The right to counsel as it exists today in the United States derives from a relatively new 
interpretation of the wording in the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution: “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to…have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence.” Currently, this means that the state will provide competent attorney services to 
citizens accused of certain crimes, at the state‟s expense. This was not the case before 1963. For 
most of this country‟s history, the right to an attorney meant only that the accused could have a 
lawyer represent him in court. It was the defendant who bore the cost, however, not the 
government. This understanding of the right to legal representation came to the U.S. from 
English common law, which allowed it in cases of misdemeanors. In 1695, the Crown granted 
this right to those accused of treason, and in 1836, to anyone charged with a felony.
1
 In none of 
these circumstances was government-funded provision of counsel implied. After the American 
colonies gained their independence in the late 18th century, they retained the common law legal 
system of Britain and so adopted this conception of the right to counsel as well. When in 1791 
                                                 
1
 Michael E. Lubowitz, “Note: The Right to Counsel of Choice After Wheat V. United States: Whose Choice Is It?,” 
39 Am. U.L. Rev. 437 (1990): 14, http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
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the states ratified the first ten amendments to the Constitution, what came to be known as the Bill 
of Rights, they included a right to have counsel present at criminal proceedings among the rights 
of the accused. 
 The first half of the next century saw dramatic changes in the economic and legal fields. 
Railroads connected previously disparate parts of the growing country, geographic mobility and 
professional opportunity increased, new markets developed, capitalism and ambitious 
individualism reigned. This spirit of individualism was the heart of antebellum 19th century 
American ideology, which emphasized one‟s ability to take part in this exciting period of growth, 
to prove oneself in the free market, and to contribute to society. Nowhere was this model clearer 
than in the efforts to improve the penal system. The focus of the time was on reform, on the 
ability of the individual to rehabilitate himself in new penitentiaries that used solitary 
confinement to force occupants to consider why they were there, and how to become valuable 
participants in society upon release. Despite these changes in crime and punishment, which 
proved largely unsuccessful, if not cruel, attention to criminal defendants lagged behind. The 
legal profession may have swelled throughout the 1800s, with the creation of the American Bar 
Association (ABA) in 1878, and the National Bar Association in 1887, but the most common and 
lucrative track was not in criminal defense. The Wall Street lawyer had his origins in this period, 
and attorneys were concerned primarily with themselves, then their clients, and lastly with the 
public at large.
2
 It was not until the 1920s that the ABA established its Standing Committee on 
Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants (SCLAID), which still operates today.
3
 While activism on 
                                                 
2
 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Touchstone, 2005), 485-489. 
3
 American Bar Association Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, “Gideon‟s Broken 
Promise: America‟s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice,” American Bar Association, December, 2004, 4, 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf. 
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behalf of criminal defendants, particularly the poor, was not new, their right to counsel would not 
become a fact of reality for some time yet. 
 Indigent defendants‟ luck began to change in 1932, when the United States Supreme 
Court handed down its landmark decision in Powell v. Alabama.
4
 The case involved the so-called 
“Scottsboro Boys,” a group of young, black men accused of raping two white women on a train 
following a fight with a group of white men. The penalty for such a crime in Depression-era 
Alabama was death. An air of hostility and violence surrounded the proceedings, as the militia 
had to guard the defendants throughout the trial. Despite the gravity of the punishment at stake, 
the judge saw fit merely to assign the local bar at large to the defense of the young men, and only 
a Tennessee lawyer named Roddy, later aided by a retired local attorney, volunteered. The two 
were given no time to investigate the facts of the case, nor to develop a defense strategy. In view 
of these circumstances, the Supreme Court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment in ruling that the 
trial court‟s conduct was an infringement upon the defendants‟ constitutional right to due process 
of law. In capital cases, counsel must be appointed within a reasonable amount of time before a 
hearing in order to conform to due process, the Court wrote. Justice George Sutherland‟s opinion 
for the Court did mention the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but the decision turned on the 
Fourteenth‟s guarantee of due process because the Sixth Amendment only applied to the federal 
government at the time, not to the state governments. This was, after all, a state court case. The 
Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, addressed the states directly in its language, and thus 
bound the courts of Alabama. Powell marked the first time that the Supreme Court afforded the 
right to counsel such deference in the field of state law, even if it was only on Fourteenth 
                                                 
4
 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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Amendment grounds, which would increasingly become shakier legal territory in the twentieth 
century.
5
 In capital cases at least, representation became a fundamental right for the defendant. 
 Six years later, the Supreme Court continued to refine its view on the right to counsel in 
Johnson v. Zerbst.
6
 Two U.S. Marines on leave were caught with counterfeit twenty-dollar bills. 
They had an attorney present at proceedings before a grand jury, but not at trial, where they were 
subsequently convicted in federal court. Countering the Assistant District Attorney‟s opinion that 
at least one of the defendants “conducted his defence [sic] about as well as the average layman 
usually does,” Justice Hugo Black wrote that the Sixth Amendment, “…embodies a realistic 
recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal 
skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal…”7 The Sixth Amendment bars 
conviction unless someone completely and intelligently waives the right to counsel, the justices 
agreed. More importantly, the Supreme Court elevated the right to counsel in this case to one of 
the “fundamental human rights of life and liberty,” protected in the Bill of Rights. This was 
significant because Johnson, along with Powell, cleared the way for the incorporation of the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Incorporation is the process by which the Supreme Court has applied many of the limits 
to the federal government laid out in the Bill of Rights to the state governments. Historically, the 
Court has opted to do this selectively, choosing which rights should apply to states on a case by 
case basis, generally mandating that they be “fundamental,” or “the very essence of ordered 
                                                 
5
 As the Supreme Court based more cases on the Fourteenth Amendment‟s Due Process clause, the justices read 
more rights into it. Indeed, such concepts as the right to privacy, which do not explicitly appear in the Bill of Rights, 
nor the Constitution, found legitimacy in the “penumbra” of rights under the First Amendment, as Justice Black 
wrote in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which were then applied to the states via the Fourteenth. See 
pg. 4 for an explanation of incorporation. 
6
 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
7
 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 464 (1938). 
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liberty” in order to be incorporated. 8 In most instances, the Supreme Court has done this through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which mentions the states explicitly, arguing that such rights fall 
under the Fourteenth‟s Due Process clause. By the time of Johnson, the First Amendment rights 
to freedom of speech, press, and assembly had all been incorporated, and thus had to be 
respected by the state governments as vital elements of due process.
9
 The right to counsel 
seemed poised to join its counterparts. 
In 1942, however, the Court was still not prepared to incorporate the Sixth Amendment. 
Its ruling in the case of Betts v. Brady
10
 was that not every criminal prosecution required the 
provision of counsel, and that the Maryland court system‟s denial of such requests in all cases 
but those concerning rape and murder was not inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor 
did the Sixth Amendment bind Maryland, since it only as yet applied to the federal government. 
Despite the ruling in Johnson that this was a fundamental right, it apparently was only necessary 
to observe it in federal court, or in other special circumstances. Some argue that this 
inconsistency may have been due to more than a strict adherence to federalism, in that it may 
have shown a concern for burdening the states with the cost of providing representation for 
indigent defendants,
11
 who were a majority of criminal defendants by this period in US history. 
Whatever the rationale, the Court would soon continue its former dedication to indigent 
defendants in 1956, with Griffin v. Illinois.
12
 A group of convicted prisoners argued that a state 
law allowing indigents to obtain trial transcripts free of charge for appeals purposes, while 
                                                 
8
 As Justice Cardozo put it in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 325 (1937), “…pledges of particular amendments have 
been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become 
valid as against the states…” To be incorporated, a right must be a, “…principle of justice so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 
9
 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and DeJonge v. 
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
10
 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
11
 Kate Levine, “If You Cannot Afford a Lawyer: Assessing the Constitutionality of Massachusetts‟s 
Reimbursement Statue,” 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 191, 2007, 198-199, http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
12
 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
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charging for other documents referring to alleged trial errors (except in capital cases) violated 
their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Thus, inmates with financial resources had an advantage in preparing for appeals that poor 
inmates did not. While this was not a Sixth Amendment case, the language of Justice Hugo 
Black seemed to foreshadow the coming vindication of indigent defendants at the state level: 
“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of 
money he has.”13 
On March 18th, 1963, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Gideon v. 
Wainwright. The far-reaching nature of the decision grabbed headlines, as papers questioned its 
implications for state governments, and for those who had been incarcerated without counsel. 
The day after the Court announced its ruling, the New York Times referred to it as, “one of the 
most important [decisions] ever made by the Supreme Court in the criminal law field,” and then 
reprinted a large portion of Justice Hugo Black‟s opinion verbatim.14 
The facts of the case were fairly simple. Clarence Earl Gideon was arrested for breaking 
and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, which was a felony under Florida law. The 
building he allegedly entered was the Bay Harbor Pool Hall, where he had previously worked 
part-time. At trial, Gideon requested a lawyer, but was told that the state of Florida only provides 
counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases. Despite his assertions that this violated his 
constitutional rights, Gideon had to represent himself. By Black‟s account, he had performed, 
“…about as well as could be expected from a layman,” having cross-examined state witnesses, 
                                                 
13
 Deborah L. Rhode, “Access to Justice in the United States: Narrowing Gap between Principle and Practice,” 235, 
within Jorritt De Jong and Gowher Rizvi, ed.,  The State of Access: Success and Failure of Democracies to Create 
Equal Opportunities, (Harvard University: 2008), 235. 
14
 Anthony J. Lewis, “Supreme Court Extends Ruling on Free Counsel,” New York Times, March 19, 1963, 
http://www.proquest.com/. 
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examined his own witnesses, and declined to testify himself.
15
 A jury nonetheless convicted him, 
and he was sentenced to five years in state prison. Gideon subsequently made a habeas corpus 
petition to the state Supreme Court, which was denied, and then petitioned the US Supreme 
Court for review, which it granted. 
In truth, Chief Justice Earl Warren had been looking for a case that would allow the 
Court to overturn the Betts decision.
16
 Gideon provided a much better opportunity than other 
cases recently before the court, such as that of Willard Carnley, who had also lacked 
representation at trial, but had been convicted for the unsavory crime of incest.
17
 Gideon was a 
candidate with appeal, on the other hand, whose sweeping demands at trial for justice under the 
Bill of Rights could have garnered sympathy. That he was a poor drifter who had defended 
himself admirably, despite not having an attorney, would have endeared him to many Americans. 
Warren was even known to have issued written instructions to his clerks to add possible 
arguments to in forma pauperis petitions, i.e. petitions from those too poor to go through more 
formal channels of appeal (often handwritten by inmates), in order to bolster their claims.
18
 His 
desire to help the impoverished and disadvantaged of society was no secret, and seemed to play a 
major factor in determining the course of events with regards to criminal procedure in the United 
States in the mid-20th century. 
Justice Hugo Black wrote the opinion of the Court. He had ruled in favor of indigent 
defendants‟ right to counsel in two previous cases (Johnson, Griffin), and had dissented in the 
Betts case twenty years before. His stance was obvious, likely determining Chief Justice 
                                                 
15
 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 337 (1963). 
16
 Paul Finkelman and Melvin I. Urofsky, “Gideon v. Wainwright,” in “Landmark Decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Supreme Court Collection, 2003. http://library.cqpress.com/scc/ 
lndmrk03-113-6439-345883. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (New York, NY: Simon & 
Schuster, 1979), 34-35. 
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Warren‟s decision to delegate to him opinion writing responsibility.19 Black‟s wording was 
equally clear, as he railed on Betts for having been improperly decided against precedent in the 
first place, noting that the Court had been bitterly divided on the case (Gideon was a unanimous 
opinion, by contrast). His denunciation of Betts was so strong that Justice John Marshall Harlan 
II, though agreeing that it needed to be overturned, wrote a concurring opinion offering Betts a 
“more respectful burial.”20 Black declared brazenly, “Not only these precedents [those Black felt 
made Betts improperly decided in the first place] but also reason and reflection require us to 
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled [sic] into court, who 
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This 
seems to us to be an obvious truth.” Finally, the Court had incorporated the Sixth Amendment, 
steering back to the course laid before Betts had occurred in 1942. It had found that the right to 
counsel was indeed so fundamental to ordered liberty that it must be respected not just by the 
federal government, but by the states as well, in order to preserve due process in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. There had been much consternation in the two decades since Betts, as the Court 
repeatedly heard cases that asked it to find special circumstances in which the right to counsel 
was mandatory. It usually found just that. This was a time-consuming process, however, and 
finally it was clear that fairness necessitated counsel in our criminal legal system.
21
 Most states, 
with the exception of five (Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, North and South Carolina), had 
already accepted federal standards that an attorney be provided in all cases of felony.
22
 In fact, 22 
                                                 
19
 When the Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court is in the majority in a decision, he traditionally assigns which 
justice will write the Court‟s opinion. When he is not in the majority, the most senior member on the Court in the 
majority assigns. 
20
 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.  349 (1963). 
21
 Paul Finkelman and Melvin I. Urofsky, “Gideon v. Wainwright,” 2003. 
22
 Anthony J. Lewis, “Supreme Court Extends Ruling on Free Counsel,” New York Times, March 19, 1963, 
http://www.proquest.com/. 
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state Attorneys General had signed amicus briefs on behalf of Gideon‟s case. The time was ripe, 
though not just for these reasons. 
 A Washington Post article
23
 printed on March 24th, six days after the decision‟s release, 
explored one of the issues that Gideon implicated: federalism. The relationship between the 
states and the federal government has always been a point of controversy in US history, and yet 
another encroachment on state rights seemed inherent in Gideon. The article‟s title says it all: 
“States Have Helped Whittle Away Own Rights.”24 Had the states only ensured the voting rights 
of blacks, safeguarded the individual liberties that steadily became the basis of most of the 
Constitutional legal issues before the Supreme Court in the middle and late 20th century, they 
may have staved off the expansion of the federal government into their traditional spheres of 
power. As the Post put it, “In the last 30 years, the powers exercised by the Federal Government 
have increased enormously and the proportionate role of state governments in everyday life has 
decreased sharply.”25 
 This is indeed the main context in which the national struggle for the right to counsel in 
legal proceedings must be understood: the major social and legal movements of the 20th century 
in the US. As the nation faced an increasingly divisive and expensive war in Vietnam, and more 
insistent movements for civil rights and liberties, demands on the federal government‟s financial 
and Congressional might dominated the domestic arena. President Lyndon B. Johnson‟s “War on 
Poverty,” which, like many other federal programs, focused more on funding to resolve problems 
rather than direct action, is often associated with the Supreme Court‟s decision in Gideon.26 His 
ideal for a Great Society dovetailed nicely with growing social consciousness of injustice, even 
                                                 
23
 James E. Clayton, “The States Have Helped Whittle Away Own Rights,” The Washington Post, March 24, 1963, 
http://www.proquest.com/. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Jack Katz, Poor People’s Lawyers in Transition, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1982), 77. 
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as his own hawkish foreign policy made both his popularity and funding for such reforms 
evaporate. Even the traditionally conservative American Bar Association lauded the holding in 
Gideon,
27
 and advocated federal funding of criminal reform.
28
 The federal government, which 
spent the entire century growing to unprecedented proportions, obliged calls for more 
involvement with crime, responding with such measures as the Law Enforcement Assistance Act 
of 1965, which essentially threw money at local governments and police forces.
29
 As the federal 
government grew in influence, having begun with the expanded powers under the Commerce 
Clause and New Deal in the 1930s, the states lost traditional areas of control. Federal regulations 
mushroomed, and modern executive bureaucracy, resulting from laws both legislative and 
judicial in origin, took shape. 
 With this swelling in federal power came an increase in the influence of the Supreme 
Court, especially in its reach into the everyday lives of Americans. Never before had the 
institution‟s decisions so personally affected people as during the latter half of the twentieth 
century, with decisions concerning personal privacy issues like marriage, contraception, and 
abortion.
30
 The gradual incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment 
had not only allowed the federal government to usurp the states‟ traditional role in determining 
much of the law concerning their citizens‟ liberties and welfare, but had led much of the public 
to look to the nine justices for indications of how the country was to resolve these complex and 
contentious questions. 
                                                 
27
 James E. Clayton, “The States Have Helped Whittle Away Own Rights,” The Washington Post, March 24, 1963, 
http://www.proquest.com/. 
28
 Jack Katz, Poor People’s Lawyers, 77. 
29
 Freidman, A History of American Law, 508. 
30
 See Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade 410 
U.S. 113 (1973). 
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The Warren Court had also taken up the challenge of criminal defendant rights in the mid 
20th century, both as part of the Chief Justice‟s instrumental use of the law to enact often 
needed, though admittedly political, reforms, and because it was a far more difficult issue for 
politicians to broach before the late 1960s and early 1970s. Following World War II, there was a 
large upswing in crime in the US, and people looked to the increasingly powerful federal 
government to do something.
31
 Understandably, few politicians desired to appear easy on crime 
in such an environment by advocating laws and procedures that many saw as restrictive to police 
forces. The Warren Court feared no such rebukes in the 1960s. Just on the day it handed down 
Gideon, the Supreme Court released five other decisions that strengthened criminal defendant 
rights in various ways, striking down convictions for improperly admitted evidence, or other 
errors that much of the conservative public viewed as trivial compared to the crimes for which 
these villains had been convicted.
32
 But in truth, significant problems in the criminal justice 
system existed, and remedies were badly needed. While the number of attorneys in the 20th 
century skyrocketed from approximately 100,000 in 1900, to about 1 million in 2000 (an 
increase of ten-fold, compared to an overall population that had doubled), the number of lawyers 
in the field of criminal law remained less than ten percent of the total.
33
 In addition, abuses and 
unfairness in the system were a fact, which often placed the poor and non-white in the worst 
possible position to attain justice. Though debated, the Warren Court‟s work in this area likely 
did not result in the handcuffing of police forces and the widespread release of criminals to the 
streets, as the occupancy of prisons has only increased since. 
                                                 
31
 Freidman, A History of American Law, 508. 
32
 Anthony J. Lewis, “Supreme Court Extends Ruling on Free Counsel,” New York Times, March 19, 1963, 
http://www.proquest.com/. 
33
 Freidman, A History of American Law, 538, 540. 
18 
 
 Yet there was a legitimate, related cause for hesitation in the immediate aftermath of 
Gideon; the Justices had decided that the case was to be applied retroactively. This meant that 
prisoners who had been convicted without the benefit of counsel in the states could petition for 
retrial and, if the case was too long past to be tried again, release. This was the logical end of the 
type of justice the Warren Court, and indeed Black‟s opinion, intended, but its practical 
implications were intimidating. The issue had been raised well in advance, as the major 
newspapers had speculated about the possibilities of a decision favorable to Gideon. After the 
ruling‟s announcement, people waited anxiously to see how the drama would play out. 
 Worse still was the elephant that Gideon placed unsubtly in the room: now that the states 
had to provide counsel for indigent defendants in all cases resulting in jail time or worse, they 
would have to pay for these services. The financial and political burdens implied here were 
substantial, even daunting. Where were the state legislatures to find the money in their limited 
budgets for this new expense? How could the politicians possibly tell their constituencies that 
they intended to raise their tax rates in order to pay for services that would neither benefit the 
tax-payers themselves, nor punish those who had, in all likelihood in the public mind, already 
committed a crime? Finally, the Supreme Court had provided no explanation of how the states 
were to provide representation in all these cases. What system was to be implemented?  
Ultimately, the states‟ response would be begrudging at best and sneaky at worst. As 
various structures emerged to respond to this new federal mandate, the states often exploited 
every opportunity available to avoid providing counsel unless absolute necessary, and to 
encourage cost-cutting, often through low salaries of indigent defense attorneys. For many, state 
coffers did not run deep enough to stomach this new cost. Most of the problems that emerged in 
the systems that developed after Gideon can be traced back to funding issues within the states. In 
19 
 
the meantime, the Supreme Court struggled to keep Gideon alive in decisions that sought to 
inject fairness into criminal procedure by eradicating some of the dirtier tricks used against the 
accused, most often employed without counsel present to avoid detection. Its famous Miranda
34
 
decision became an equalizing guide in police procedure, and sent a message that the Court 
meant business when it came to the rights of the accused. But with the replacement of Chief 
Justice Earl Warren with Chief Justice Warren Burger, appointed by President Nixon in 1969, 
the Supreme Court would take a decidedly less aggressive stance toward criminal procedure, as 
Burger signed on to Nixon‟s anti-crime campaign.35 Soon thereafter, the Rehnquist Court would 
even try to actively dismantle what it saw as the Warren Court‟s excesses, including those in the 
realm of criminal defense jurisprudence. Yet the majority of Warren‟s work in this area, and 
certainly Gideon, at least in word if not always in practice, remained intact.
36
 
A full review of the post-Gideon criminal defendant rights cases, which further tinkered 
with police procedure, evidentiary guidelines, and appropriate attorney and filing fees, would not 
be possible here. But their impact on the events in states across the nation, including 
Massachusetts, is vital to understanding the history of the system in place today. Indeed these 
cases, and the increasing involvement of the legislative branch of the federal government in this 
area of law in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, played such an important role in the 
proceedings in states like Massachusetts that separation of the histories is unwise. For this 
reason, cases such as Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), which extended the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel to misdemeanor proceedings, and the legislative history of the 
creation of such entities as the Legal Services Corporation under President Nixon in 1974, will 
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be discussed later, in conjunction with the indigent defense histories in Massachusetts and 
Boston. 
The Right to Counsel: the Massachusetts Context 
 
Massachusetts has a long legal history in its own right. The Puritans were an extremely 
litigious people, who chose to document much of their daily lives, as well as the goings-on of 
their communities. In 1791-1792 Rev. Jeremy Belknap founded the Massachusetts Historical 
Society, the first such organization in U.S. history.
37
 In addition, the Constitution of 
Massachusetts is the oldest, written constitution in the world that has remained in use since its 
creation. In the context of indigent and criminal rights, Massachusetts also boasts a lengthy and 
impressive record. As often as not, the state has found itself at the forefront in a wide range of 
issues, many of which would today be classified as “progressive.” 
 To begin with, colonial Massachusetts may have been a Puritanical society focused on 
high morality in order to be a “beacon unto the world,” as Massachusetts Bay Colony Governor 
John Winthrop put it, but the colony also had a strong respect for at least one right of the 
accused. Beginning in 1630, the colony of Massachusetts was the only one that appointed 
counsel in cases of capital punishment. While it would not always be the national leader in the 
area of death penalty abolition, this showed not just a strong tie to the English common law that 
also allowed defendants to be represented by counsel, but an implicit understanding that in 
certain circumstances, the stakes are so high, and the situation so grave, as to demand learned 
counsel in order to ensure fairness. Having such a perspective early on in its history would lead 
Massachusetts to be ahead of the curve on issues of criminal defense procedure for centuries to 
come. 
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 Indeed, the Massachusetts Constitution has other distinctions beyond its age and 
continuity. It also enshrined a right to counsel a full decade before the United States Constitution 
did. This was not too great a feat, since all the states had constitutions during the period where 
the Articles of Confederation were in use following the Revolutionary War, and so they all 
predated the US Constitution as well. But the fact that the Massachusetts Constitution remained 
in use (though with plenty of amendments, of course) does lend Article XII of Part I some 
special validity. It reads, “[E]very subject shall have a right to… be fully heard in his defense by 
himself, or his council at his election.”38 To be sure, this had the same meaning as the common 
law and the federal standard that was followed for well over a century: counsel may be present, 
but the state will not provide it, with the exception of capital cases. Again, this important 
distinction, taken from history, molded the meaning of the Massachusetts interpretation of the 
right to representation in court. 
 During the 19th century, the state always had at least some interest group lobbying for 
representation rights, or standouts whose stories exemplified a charitable spirit. There were 
exceptions, to be sure. When the new penitentiary system, supposedly an effective and 
innovative way to reform criminals into productive members of society, arose in the early 19th 
century, Massachusetts bailed had out by the 1840s, most likely due to budget concerns, as 
opposed to humanitarian motivations.
39
 But on the whole, Massachusetts came out on the side of 
defense rights in this period. 
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 In 1844, one event demonstrated this spirit. An appeal
40
 went out in the Cincinnati 
Weekly Herald and Philanthropist for money to pay for the attorneys of two men who had been 
arrested and jailed in Pensacola, Florida, and Baltimore, Maryland. Both prisoners were 
Massachusetts residents, from Cape Cod and Salem, and both had been incarcerated for their 
work as abolitionists. The article mentioned that in the case of the man from Salem, funding had 
already in part been obtained from donors in Boston, where a committee had been established for 
the continuing litigation. Other states were clearly involved as well, but that the Boston 
involvement was emphasized tends to show the commitment of at least some Massachusetts 
citizens to obtaining justice through counsel. 
 The following February, an even more telling event occurred. A joint special committee 
in the Massachusetts Senate advised the governor regarding recent development in South 
Carolina. Specifically, Massachusetts trade ships had docked in Charleston, and frequently found 
themselves subjected to intolerable behavior, including the imprisonment, corporal punishment, 
and sale into slavery of freedmen from Massachusetts who had committed no crime, in what the 
committee saw as a blatant violation of federal law. Among the resolutions the committee 
recommended, and prayed the Governor enact, was to send an agent to South Carolina to inspect 
its prisons and determine how many Massachusetts residents were being unlawfully held. The 
committee added, “The said agent shall also be enabled to bring and prosecute, with the aid of 
counsel, one or more suits in behalf of any citizen that may be so imprisoned, at the expense of 
Massachusetts [emphasis added]…”41 Here, members of the Massachusetts legislature 
specifically offered to have stated-funded provision of counsel on behalf of its citizens. While 
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not the only case of this sort of arrangement in the history of the states, Massachusetts still 
demonstrated here its willingness to employ the right to representation in a more liberal fashion 
than was seen at the national level for a century. 
 In another example, there was a “public meeting of the citizens of Boston” at Faneuil 
Hall on April 28, 1848 concerning “The Friends of Liberty Throughout the United States.”42 This 
group met in reference to three men who had recently been arrested in Washington, DC for their 
involvement in helping fugitive slaves, which was illegal in the capital at the time. The group 
from Boston, who all signed their names, was authorized to raise money to employ counsel for 
the three men. Their plea was potent: “We wish to bring it [the issues surrounding slavery] 
before the Supreme Court, and to have it presented there, along with some other closely related 
questions, by the very ablest of counsel. To do that, money is needed; and we call on you, friends 
of liberty, to furnish it. Even pirates and murderers are entitled to counsel—how much more 
men, guilty of only an act of humanity, prisoners in the midst of a hostile community, 
surrounded by enemies thirsting for their blood!” Clearly, the fifteen men who signed the 
document adhered not only to the right of counsel in Massachusetts established since colonial 
times, for capital cases, but also to a broader application of it. They understood the necessity of 
competent, indeed talented, attorneys to achieve goals in the courtroom, and were not shy about 
applying the traditional right both to this context of ambition and to non-capital cases. All this, 
even before the Compromise of 1850. 
 Other examples of Massachusetts‟, and increasingly Boston‟s, commitment to legal rights 
abound. In 1860, Massachusetts was the only state to allow blacks on its juries.
43
 The story of 
John Augustus of Boston, who between 1841 and his death in 1859, bailed out and helped 
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rehabilitate over 2,000 convicts, was demonstrative as well. His work helped move the state 
toward probation laws in 1878 and 1891, which allowed a measure of clemency to otherwise 
hopeless prisoners.
44
 These laws created state-funded probation officers to evaluate prisoners and 
to release those who had shown significant signs of improvement.
45
 Such officers, while not 
attorneys, did act as Massachusetts-paid advocates, further entrenching the notion of state-funded 
counsel in the history of Massachusetts. Augustus himself had acted as pseudo counsel for many, 
and wrote in an account of his work that nine of every ten people that for whom he posted bail 
were too poor to afford an attorney.
46
 Of such cases, he wrote, “Here then, was opportunity for 
me to labor, for I thought it as much a duty to have the temple of justice watched…as for the 
accuser to attempt to show their guilt.” 47 While early on Augustus faced opposition from police 
officers and some less sympathetic citizens, he noted that on the whole, judges, clerks, the press, 
and the public at large in Boston came to support his work. Indeed, he mentioned that “…a spirit 
of reform and improvement has pervaded our city institutions,”48 indicating once again the 
exceptionalism found in Massachusetts in the treatment of the accused. 
 By 1900, the Boston Bar Association had formed the Boston Legal Aid Society,
49
 and 
though the ABA had formed SCLAID by the 1920s, the state of Massachusetts would still be a 
leader in the struggle for indigent defendant rights up until 1963. In 1957, a full five years before 
Gideon, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) mentioned in Pugliese v 
Commonwealth
50
 that there were specific, non-capital cases in which the right to counsel is 
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necessary for a fair trial. In 1958, the SJC promulgated Rule 10, which guaranteed exactly what 
Gideon would later: the right to an attorney, free of charge, in all felony proceedings at the state 
level.
51
 In 1960, the Massachusetts legislature joined the state‟s judicial branch in addressing the 
issue by creating the Massachusetts Defenders‟ Committee, which sought to defend all indigent 
defendants in non-capital cases.
52
 Finally, the last pre-Gideon development in Massachusetts 
with regards to the right of the poor to representation was actually the state Attorney General‟s 
signature. Massachusetts joined the other 21 states that wrote amicus briefs in support of 
Gideon‟s case against the state of Florida, in spite of the inevitable loss of state power, and 
increase in budgetary concerns, wrapped up in the case. The state‟s history made much of that a 
smaller concern than for other states like North Carolina, which still had not even adopted 
federal standards of representing indigents in felony cases. 
 In sum, Massachusetts in many ways exemplified the best of the national character in the 
development of the right to counsel in the United States. The state often outdid the national 
government in provision of such services throughout earlier history, which was uncommon for 
Bill of Rights issues, generally speaking. Yet the national context would still play a major role in 
the shaping of policy in Massachusetts after the Gideon decision, as it would for every state.
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Chapter Two 
Boston’s Road to Gideon  
 
The access to legal services afforded poor people in Boston in the years before 1963 was 
broader than in many other major cities in the U.S., but still ultimately demonstrated the need for 
federal intervention. Despite a mounting interest in such matters in the late 1800s and into the 
following century, both from social reformers and increasingly the organized bar, impoverished 
citizens from all of Massachusetts lacked a legally-binding statement of their right to entry to the 
justice system (outside of capital cases) until promulgation of Rule 10 by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in 1958. One private vehicle for this mandate‟s implementation may have already been in 
place in the Voluntary Defenders Committee, but two years passed before the legislature created 
the successor Massachusetts Defenders Committee to provide any public funding to fulfill the 
SJC‟s ruling. While these advances prefigured a smooth transition into a post-Gideon world, by 
1965, “…in the vast majority of the District Courts, in spite of the constitutional mandate of 
Gideon, no representation was available to persons accused of crime unable to afford private 
counsel.”1 Clearly, problems persisted. Boston‟s innovative attempts to solve these problems in 
compliance with Gideon, while later dependant on federal involvement and funding, began in the 
spirit forged in the city long before. 
The Boston Legal Aid Society was the fourth entity of its kind in the country at its 
establishment in 1900, and it joined a progressive, nationwide legal aid movement in the first 
half of the 20th century.
2
 Recognition of the persistent exclusion of the impoverished from legal 
institutions caused by the country‟s rapidly growing urban population had begun to set in. 
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Supporting legal aid societies allowed city bar associations to live up to their lofty, self-declared 
social responsibility of providing access to justice for all citizens.
3
 In addition to the selective 
nature of the distribution of these services, such as only choosing to represent the supposedly 
“meritorious poor,”4 two large problems existed with this formula in Boston, despite the 
accolades the Society there was to receive. First, only 31% of the Society‟s funding actually 
came from the Boston Bar Association,
5
 indicating a less-than-ubiquitous dedication to legal 
services for the poor among lawyers outside the movement. Second, “the Society's most 
significant taboos were on initiating divorces and defending criminal complaints.”6 Thus, despite 
a growing national and local commitment to providing counsel for indigents, such services were 
relegated to the civil realm (non-criminal legal areas such as employment and contract disputes, 
probate, loans, personal injury, etc.) during this period, without often broaching the rights of the 
criminally accused. 
 In fact, “[u]ntil 1935 there was no organization in Massachusetts equipped even partially 
to provide representation to those accused of crime and unable to afford counsel. Likewise, no 
statute or rule of court required the assignment of counsel, except to those accused of capital 
crimes.”7 It was the Voluntary Defenders Committee, founded that year by five Boston Bar 
Association members, that would be first to provide such indigent criminal defense services in 
the city. Funding for the project came initially from solicitation of members of the bar, and later 
from the United Fund of Boston. However, there was only enough to cover defendants in three of 
Boston‟s 14 counties at first (Suffolk, Middlesex, and Norfolk counties, i.e. Metropolitan 
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Boston), and only at the superior court level at that.
8
 With extended funding, however, the 
Committee was able to expand its operations to Hampden County in 1953, and to open a one-
person office in Springfield the following year.
9
 By 1958, it had offices in the western counties 
of Hampshire, Franklin, and Berkshire as well.
10
 Despite the Voluntary Defenders‟ best efforts, 
the Boston community remained underserved, as Boston Bar Association President Claude Cross 
observed in 1957 that 54% of criminal defendants still went without an attorney.
11
 
 Perhaps unexpectedly, the early years of the Cold War led to significant advances within 
the Boston Bar to provide legal counsel to the accused who could obtain it in no other way: 
alleged Communists. As Bar President Charles W. Bartlett noted in April of 1967, “Although the 
whole era [of McCarthyism] has passed, we in the Boston Bar Association do have it to thank for 
the creation of the Boston Bar Foundation. In 1956 the Fund for the Republic wanted to make 
available monies for the defense of indigent persons accused of subversive activities. They were 
characterized as „unpopular causes.‟”12 Thus, one of the Bar‟s earliest initiatives, outside of vocal 
support for the Boston Legal Aid Society, to provide representation for poor clients was actually 
directed at suspected subversives. Admittedly, the Bar had not warmed to this tactic at first and 
had even feared that Communists lurked among its own ranks, but its Council later passed a 
resolution noting the rights of all citizens to an attorney.
13
 While just a portion of the original 
$10,000 funds for the project were spent (on an educational pamphlet entitled “If You Are 
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Arrested”14), these events still marked an important shift in the Boston Bar from merely an 
agency reflective of the professional interests of its member lawyers, to an organization 
concerned with the public welfare. 
 The Boston Legal Aid Society, the Voluntary Defenders Committee, and the Boston Bar 
Association‟s growing acceptance of legal aid and indigent criminal defense efforts, though 
surely beneficial to many people in Boston‟s metropolitan area, did not address in a uniform and 
universal manner the core issue. Exactly for whom was counsel expressly mandatory, and when? 
Beyond the fact that an attorney had to be provided in cases for which there was the possibility 
of capital punishment, few guidelines existed. The most recent major U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions touching on the topic, Betts (1942) and Griffin (1956), were almost at loggerheads, and 
nothing in Massachusetts statutory law clearly prescribed guidelines for when the court must 
provide counsel. In 1957, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts handed down two rulings 
that would address the right to counsel, and which would anticipate their subsequent Rule 10: 
Pugliese v. Commonwealth,
15
 and Brown v. Commonwealth.
16
 
 In Pugliese, Chief Justice Raymond Sanger Wilkins described the petitioner, convicted of 
kidnapping and assault with intent to rob, as a “high grade moron” who was “of low intelligence 
at about the border line of feeble-mindedness.”17 Such were the medical terms of the day. Having 
received the services of a member of the Voluntary Defenders Committee in Suffolk County 
Superior Court, the petitioner lacked representation for another charge in Middlesex County, as 
the Voluntary Defenders did not operate there for lack of staff in 1946. Because of this, he filed a 
writ of error under article twelve of the Massachusetts Constitution, which guaranteed a state 
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right to counsel (see chapter one). The SJC quoted its own 1949 precedent, stating, “[The] law, 
as we understand it, requires assignment of counsel in noncapital cases only when the defendant, 
by reason of youth, inexperience, or incapacity of some kind, or by reason of some unfair 
conduct by the public authorities, or of complication of issues, or of some special prejudice or 
disadvantage, stands in need of counsel in order to secure the fundamentals of a fair trial.” 
Wilkins wrote that the petitioner‟s feeble-mindedness surely fell under the category “incapacity 
of some kind,” and that he thus should have received counsel. 
 The ruling in Pugliese clearly sustained a broad right to counsel by historical standards: it 
reaffirmed that certain cases, not just capital ones, warranted government provision of an 
attorney. General poverty was not among these exceptions, but the court demonstrated a 
willingness to extend counsel rights that it would likely not have even twenty years before. 
Brown relied on Pugliese and also tended to expand defendant rights, asserting that “an accretion 
of prejudicial happenings which added up to a failure to secure the fundamentals of a fair trial” 
could constitute a violation of article twelve of the Massachusetts Constitution.
18
 These 
happenings,
19
 while certainly detrimental to the defendant‟s case, would also have been unlikely 
to convince a justice to overturn an otherwise sound conviction in the past. These two decisions 
clearly leaned toward expanding the right to counsel in Massachusetts, but did little to explain 
where the ultimate line was to be drawn. Just how many “accretions of prejudicial happenings” 
would lead to the conclusion that a defendant should have had a lawyer? If the SJC considered 
Pugliese‟s educational and job background in determining he was “feeble-minded” and thus 
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deserved counsel, would all people (usually poor) who lacked a certain educational level 
automatically be eligible? 
 The next year, the Supreme Judicial Court clarified many such questions as to who was to 
receive state-funded counsel and when in the state of Massachusetts. In 1958, it promulgated 
Rule 10, later amended and referred to as Rule 3:10, which still exists today. Rule 10 was quite 
similar to Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Procedures,
20
 demonstrating that federal influence 
existed even before Gideon, despite Massachusetts‟ precocious nature with regards to the right to 
counsel. The Rule provided that, “a defendant be advised of his right to counsel and providing 
for the assignment of counsel „at every step of the proceeding‟ [when]…charged with a non-
capital felony in the Superior Court, in the absence of a waiver of his right to counsel.”21 Thus, 
there was now the first mandatory provision of state-funded counsel to all defendants in 
Massachusetts for non-capital crimes in superior court and above. Further, defendants had to be 
informed of this right, and could only waive it intelligently, with a waiver certificate signed by 
the judge. This provision of counsel applied to all proceedings, not just at trial: arraignment, after 
any pleas or findings, and throughout the appeals process. 
 There are two aspects of Rule 10 that had a particular bearing on its future. First, it listed 
two limitations. The Rule only applied to superior courts, not district courts. Thus, while Rule 10 
marked a colossal step forward in the state‟s obligation to provide counsel for criminal 
defendants, it also had an inherent and potentially costly limit, as the majority of poor defendants 
were likely to need assistance at the lower court levels. The upshot, of course, was that those 
who stood to lose the most in higher court settings with more punitive sentences could now 
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retain the service of a lawyer. The second limitation was that Rule 10 only applied to felony 
cases, not misdemeanors. Should a defendant face a misdemeanor charge with a stringent 
sentence, he might still lack counsel. 
The second crucial aspect of Rule 10 was a separate clause which provided for, 
“representation of an indigent defendant accused of a non-capital crime if a court in its discretion 
should determine „that the gravity of the charge or other circumstances require such 
representation.‟”22 This gave superior court judges great latitude in determining who should 
receive counsel, opening the possibility to more widespread provision of attorneys than the 
language of the rest of Rule 10 dictated. For example, while a felony defendant required an 
attorney in superior court under Rule 10, a misdemeanor defendant could still receive counsel if 
the judge thought the circumstances warranted it. (Before Gideon, Rule 10 would be amended to 
allow district court judges to use their discretion in assigning counsel as well, though it was not 
mandatory that they did so.)
23
 
 By design or not, this pair of stipulations suggested one of the problems that would lead 
the discourse on the right to counsel not just in Boston, but nationwide, especially after Gideon: 
how many people could the system reasonably accommodate? How many should it 
accommodate? Despite the limits of Rule 10 mentioned above, concerns already abounded in 
1958 about the possible consequences of such a rule. The Boston Bar Journal predicted, “[I]t is 
likely that there will be a marked increase in the number of instances in which courts will be 
naming attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. This problem will probably not 
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become acute immediately…”24 The Journal went on to note that voluntary defender groups had 
lawyers in areas covering 67% of the state‟s population, and that it was confident that, for the 
time being, the Voluntary Defenders Committee could handle the increase in cases that Rule 10 
would inevitably bring.
25
 Until 1960, this is exactly what happened; the Voluntary Defenders 
bore the brunt of Rule 10‟s aftermath until its funding ran out in expectation of the 
Massachusetts legislature‟s solution: the Massachusetts Defenders Committee.26 
 The MDC arose directly out of bills that the Voluntary Defenders Committee and the 
Secretary of the Supreme Judicial Court, John A. Daly,
27
 filed with the legislature, petitioning it 
to make the funding for indigent criminal defense a state responsibility.
28
 Indirectly, the MDC 
owed its existence to historical factors. The Massachusetts Bar Association had already asked the 
legislature in 1956 (before Rule 10) to provide public funding to help the Voluntary Defenders 
Committee,
29
 an act which was indicative of a longstanding ideology with regards to the 
provision of counsel in criminal cases, and which hinted at future debates in the matter. As the 
Boston Bar put it in 1958, “Understandably, community funded authorities are reluctant to 
continue their support of what is essentially a state obligation, particularly when the demands on 
their limited resources for community needs are so great.”30 The sentiment that one day, the state 
would foot the bill for such legal services, rather than privately run organizations such as the 
Voluntary Defenders, was pervasive even during the original legal aid movement in the early 
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twentieth century.
31
 The imminence of this day in light of Rule 10 was why the funders of the 
Voluntary Defenders decided to stop paying for what had effectively become a state function.
32
 
National consensus seemed to be building on the topic. In 1958, counsel for indigent defendants 
in non-capital cases was mandated in 39 states, and the District of Columbia. Eleven of these 
gave the attorneys no compensation (thus, they were volunteers, much like Boston‟s Voluntary 
Defenders), while the remaining 28 provided at least some state compensation.
33
 
The Bar‟s words in 1958 also served as a precursor to another issue that still has not been 
resolved in every state: even if the government was to pay for these legal expenses, and not 
private entities, which government was to pay, state or local? Rule 10 had already pushed 
Massachusetts in the direction of established organizations, as superior court justices tended to 
use Voluntary Defenders instead of individually assigned counsel.
34
 Indeed, the assigned counsel 
system, administered by the bar or by other non-state entities, would eventually disappear in 
Massachusetts altogether. But while the establishment of the MDC helped usher this change in, 
since the MDC was regarded as “in effect…a State-wide public defender system,”35 this did not 
change the fact that the state and the local governments shared the cost of indigent defense for 
some time to come. 
Established in August, 1960 under General Law c. 221, § 34D, the Massachusetts 
Defenders Committee strove to provide counsel to indigent defendants in whatever 
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circumstances specified by the Massachusetts legislature and the Supreme Judicial Court.
36
 This 
meant not only that the MDC was responsible for implementation of Rule 10, but that it would 
be subject to future scrutiny and rule-making from the SJC. Indeed, the SJC also appointed the 
entire eleven-attorney Committee, to serve without compensation. These eleven appointed one 
member to be Chief Counsel, who employed five full-time lawyers in the three major 
metropolitan counties of Boston. He was also to contract for six part-time attorneys to serve the 
rest of Boston, which was divided into six districts.
37
 Its starting budget was just $61,588, and 
the MDC handled a sizeable 2,847 cases in its first two years, given its small staff.
38
 
This was the state of affairs in Boston when Gideon was handed down in 1963. 
Considering the lengthy precedent of British and American case law opposed to it, the favor 
allotted the right to counsel as a state financial responsibility in Massachusetts, and in most states 
by this time, was almost shocking. Yet as the Boston Globe noted in 1958, “The insistence that 
all charged with serious crimes shall have an opportunity to obtain counsel is a welcome and 
little-noticed development of the past few years. It has been stimulated, here and elsewhere, by 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.”39 Despite the strides that had been made at the 
state level, both through volunteer efforts, the organized bar, the legislature, and the courts, the 
discourse at the federal level still had a substantial impact on the proceedings at this time. Once 
the right to counsel in all courts where serious crimes are considered was extended in Gideon, 
municipal, state, and private institutions clamored to adjust, out of necessity, through their own 
initiative, and with the aid of funding from a still expanding national government.
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Chapter Three 
Early Burdens of Gideon 
 
As recounted in chapter one, the country welcomed Gideon with uncertainty. Politics 
certainly played a role, as some proclaimed the ruling unnecessary and foolish catering to 
criminals. There were also worries that the decision would lead to a mass exodus of convicts 
from prisons back into society, since most federal and state courts ascribed Gideon retrospective 
effect.
1
 This meant that the right to counsel could be applied to cases retroactively, so that 
defendants convicted before 1963 without legally-mandated aid of an attorney could petition to 
have their convictions overturned. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed with this 
concept in 1965, perhaps lending credence to this fear.
2
 The primary concern, however, was how 
the states were to implement Gideon. Even in Massachusetts, where Rule 10 already safeguarded 
much the same Sixth Amendment guarantees as Gideon, the Supreme Court‟s impact on state 
court procedure, statutory appropriations, and private sector involvement was clear. 
 A February, 1964 directive from Judge Kenneth L. Nash, Chief Justice of the District 
Courts of Massachusetts, marked the first large-scale execution of Gideon‟s mandate. It required 
every district court in the state to determine the indigency of all criminal defendants, inform 
them of their right to an attorney, and provide counsel from the Massachusetts Defenders 
Committee if the defendants requested it.
3
 As it had in the 1950s, the Massachusetts court system 
was continuing to lead the Commonwealth in the interpretation and development of the right to 
counsel in the 1960s. The renewed energy behind this endeavor came from the national legal 
discussion dominated by the Supreme Court. Indeed, “Following Gideon, our [Massachusetts] 
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Superior Court Justices commenced to appoint counsel for all indigent defendants in the Superior 
Court, whether charged with felony or misdemeanor, except upon clear waiver.”4 
Such adjustments were not left to the lower courts to administer alone. Where it 
previously had used article twelve of the Massachusetts Constitution to broaden the right to 
counsel, the Supreme Judicial Court now had to consider the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the U.S. Constitution, as understood by the U.S. Supreme Court. In April 1964, the SJC cited 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (see chapter one), Gideon, and other Sixth Amendment rulings 
of the U.S. Supreme Court in another suggested deviation from traditional Commonwealth 
practice. “In view of the possible implications in those cases and of others to follow, the prudent 
course for a District Court judge is to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant in every case 
where there is to be a probable cause hearing…except for the most trifling offences for which no 
sentence of imprisonment may be imposed.”5 The SJC thus reaffirmed the logic of Judge Nash‟s 
directive from earlier in the year. Both of these decisions, based on U.S. Supreme Court 
reasoning, fundamentally expanded the right to counsel in Massachusetts, in that they required 
counsel for misdemeanor cases in the district courts, neither of which was mandatory under Rule 
10.
6
 On June 29, 1964, the SJC amended Rule 10 to reflect the changing atmosphere in criminal 
defense procedure, requiring the provision of counsel in any case where imprisonment could be 
imposed, in every court in the Commonwealth.
7
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The legislative response to Gideon was less zealous. The drive by the judiciary to fully 
implement the right to counsel posed a great strain on a relatively new system, given that the 
MDC had just been founded three years earlier. As one legal services expert at the time put it, 
“In practice, this directive [Judge Nash‟s for the district courts] cannot produce a solution to the 
problem of representation for indigent defendants simply because of the demands it makes on the 
limited staff and resources of the [Massachusetts] Defenders Committee.”8 The funding and 
resources for the MDC, entirely from the state, had already increased significantly by September 
of 1964. In its four years of existence, the MDC‟s meager original budget of $61,588 expanded 
to $168,000, its staff from 11 attorneys to 22 (10 in Boston), with the aid of two new 
investigators.
9
 While this was sufficient to comply with the new Rule 10 in all superior courts, it 
was “completely inadequate to handle the volume of cases” in the district courts.10 Legislative 
appropriations for MDC representation in the district courts fell well short
11
 of what now seemed 
like the lofty goals of the amended Rule 10. Even before Gideon, the struggles of the MDC in the 
district courts were apparent, and the SJC‟s Rule 11 represented one of many innovative if 
imperfect attempts to solve this recurrent financing problem. This rule allowed law school 
students to act as assigned counsel for indigent defendants in certain cases in exchange for 
academic credits. In 1961, Boston University Law School had begun such a program in the 
Boston Municipal Court with Massachusetts Bar Association supervision, though controversy 
soon arose.
12
  Gideon and Rule 10 both called for at least some standard of quality in 
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representation, for which law students would be hard-pressed to qualify, and critics argued that 
the students were using the legal plight of the poor to gain advantageous professional experience. 
Proponents countered that sub-standard legal advice was better than none at all for these 
defendants. 
The BU law student defender project‟s extension to the Roxbury District Court, where 
Judge Elwood S. McKenney estimated that over 70% of the 30,000 criminal complaints filed 
annually went without representation,
13
 demonstrated a theme more enduring than the 
disagreement about the wisdom of permitting students to handle real legal cases. Despite the fact 
that students would work under MDC attorneys, it was national funding that made this move 
possible, not state. The Ford Foundation awarded the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association, founded in 1911 as part of the legal aid movement, a grant which NLADA in turn 
used to fund such programs across the country. NLADA also financed (through the Action for 
Boston Community Development) a similar initiative in the Suffolk County Model Defender 
Project, through which the Massachusetts Defenders Committee provided counsel to indigents in 
the city‟s district courts for any but capital crimes, which were otherwise covered.14 While such 
grants came initially from private sources, they still marked the beginning of Massachusetts‟ 
dependence on outside funding for criminal defense measures, a burden soon shifted onto the 
federal government. 
Despite these efforts, by 1966 the prospects of a ubiquitous and equitable right to counsel 
throughout Boston any time soon were grim. The program in Suffolk County kept its ten district 
courts well-supplied, but due to personnel shortages, the MDC was able to provide only 
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“sporadic” representation in 62 of the 72 district courts throughout the state.15 “For the most part, 
except in Suffolk County, the burden of compliance with Rule 10 fell in the district courts on 
members of the Bar,” individuals selected by judges, often through lists kept by local bar 
association panels.
16
 MDC caseloads were mounting to unwieldy heights: in September alone of 
1965, the Committee received 414 new cases, compared to over twice as many (911) in 
September, 1966.
17
 These circumstances made a resort to federal assistance seem a foregone 
conclusion, but a national agenda pushed by the current administration had as much to do with 
this phenomenon as insufficient state appropriations. 
President Lyndon Baines Johnson‟s most controversial legacy may well be the increased 
U.S. commitment to war in Vietnam, but he had actually envisioned domestic policy as his 
expertise. He dedicated much of his term as President, elected in 1964 after replacing his 
assassinated predecessor, to both enacting the social reforms begun by John F. Kennedy and his 
own program of welfare, which he branded his War on Poverty. This included legal services. As 
Boston Bar Association President John G. Brooks, a major impetus behind the legal services 
movement in Boston, described it in 1973: 
For the first time in our history there appeared an explicit recognition that 
there is a public responsibility to provide to the indigent not only subsistence, 
housing and medical care but legal assistance as well, and that private 
philanthropy, through privately supported Legal Aid Societies and efforts 
of individual lawyers, was simply inadequate to the task of spreading enough 
justice throughout our society.
18
 
 
Johnson, much like Kennedy, saw the role that the legal sector could play in the civil rights 
movement and in the alleviation of poverty throughout the country, especially in urban areas. 
The great social unrest of the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, stemming from such wide-
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ranging causes as the fight for racial equality, to youth‟s dissatisfaction with free speech rights, 
to tension over the war abroad, to renewed concern for social justice, touched all segments of 
U.S. society. Some have even contended that this atmosphere influenced, or at the very least 
made possible, the Supreme Court‟s decision in Gideon.19 What is certain is that such sentiments 
were pervasive enough to allow Johnson to endorse and Congress to pass the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964, which created the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). This 
legislation and its accompanying federal agency altered the course of the legal aid movement 
dramatically. 
 The OEO operated the Legal Services Program (LSP) from 1965 onward, the two 
primary functions of which were to establish neighborhood legal offices, and to provide funding 
for local legal assistance programs. These neighborhood offices embodied a methodology 
radically different from that of the legal aid reformers of the early 20th century, in that they were 
meant to provide easy access to all those who could not afford a lawyer, not merely the 
“meritorious poor,” and that they also served as advocacy groups for social change, rather than 
focusing all their activity on individual cases.
20
 The vast majority of the funds from the OEO 
went to serve the civil legal needs of the poor, as opposed to the criminal, and so did little to 
lighten the load often shouldered by the bar across the country in that regard.
21
 Funds from OEO 
also often went to local organizations that were vocal in their calls for the increased availability 
and improvement of the legal services to the poor. This strategy rankled conservatives; 
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California Governor Ronald Reagan and soon-to-be Vice President Spiro Agnew both criticized 
the growth of the legal services movement and vilified the neighborhood offices.
22
 Both would 
play a role in later administrations‟ efforts to end federal funding for such state and local 
programs. 
 But during the Johnson years, money poured into states to finance local representation of 
and advocacy for the legal needs of the poor. Massachusetts‟ reeling indigent defense and 
poverty law system was among the fortunate recipients. Charles W. Bartlett, the Boston Bar 
President in 1966, observed, “Anyone reading the newspapers in this day and age is bound to be 
aware of federal money in every conceivable area.”23 He went on to mention the most recent 
grant from the OEO to the Voluntary Defenders Committee in July, which still operated as a 
private (and greatly reduced) entity,  most of which went to the Massachusetts Defenders 
Committee to expand throughout the state.
24
 OEO apparently awarded the grant based on the 
success of the Suffolk County Model Defender Project, which had demonstrated the need for 
indigent defenders in the district courts.
25
 The grant also helped MDC work with social agencies, 
especially in cases of juveniles, who had for decades presented special problems to the legal 
system. 
 OEO funding, in addition to a grant from the Ford Foundation, also established a 
neighborhood legal office in Boston in the form of the Boston Legal Assistance Project in 
1967.
26
 This was part of an overall $34 million that the federal government paid to run 186 legal 
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service programs across the U.S. at the time.
27
 The Boston Legal Aid Society and the Action for 
Boston Community Development coordinated the Project‟s establishment. In addition to 
providing its own counseling, the Project sought to work with the organized bar to solicit legal 
services for those who could not ordinarily afford them.
28
  
 There was little time for the Massachusetts Defenders Committee to adjust to these 
developments, however. The U.S. Supreme Court‟s decision in June, 1966 had proven far more 
divisive than Gideon. Miranda v. Arizona,
29
 which led to the now well-known “Miranda 
warnings,” seemed to many an open attack on the dutiful police officers who were trying to 
protect the public from criminals. The ruling demanded that police and enforcement officials 
respect certain fundamental rights and privileges for the accused once taken into custody, such as 
advising him of his right to remain silent before an interrogation takes place. Of particular 
importance to indigent defense programs across the nation, the decision also required that a 
defendant, poor or otherwise, must be advised of her right to an attorney before interrogation, 
and if incapable of retaining one, must be provided with one at the state‟s expense. Chief Justice 
Earl Warren wrote, “The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege [of the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment] exists for the indigent as well as the affluent.”30 
Again, Bartlett described the situation, lamenting that Miranda, “…has created practical 
problems in law enforcement and the administration of justice which are difficult to solve unless 
an organization such as Massachusetts Defenders Committee has attorneys available around the 
clock.”31 Indeed, MDC attorneys had not even been able to provide services for most of those in 
the district courts, and doubtless had little time left over to administer to interrogation 
                                                 
27
 Charles W. Bartlett, “The President‟s Page,” Boston Bar Journal 11, no. 3 (1967): 5, http://heinonline.org. 
28
 Jones, Discovering the Public Interest, 119. 
29
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, (1966). 
30
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 472, (1966). 
31
 Charles W. Bartlett, “The President‟s Page,” Boston Bar Journal 10, no. 3 (1966): 4, http://heinonline.org. 
44 
 
proceedings of those not even officially charged with a crime yet. Despite these obvious 
concerns and systemic failures, few solutions aside from persistent application for federal 
financial aid presented themselves. Given the chronic underfunding of the MDC, and given that 
organizations like the Boston Legal Aid Society and the Boston Legal Assistance Project 
remained reluctant to take on criminal defendants in additional to their already overwhelming 
caseload, thousands still went to court without the benefit of an attorney. 
 The Supreme Judicial Court used its decision in Abodeely v. County of Worcester
32
 as an 
opportunity to respond to the growing funding dilemma. The decision, handed down June 12, 
1967, centered on whether Section 8, chapter 213 of the Massachusetts General Laws applied to 
indigent criminal defense lawyers. The statute required that state courts submit orders for 
payment to the county treasuries for “services and expenses incident to their sittings in the 
several counties.”33 The SJC held that defense attorneys‟ fees fell under such services and 
expenses, and thus that the counties were expected to pay for indigent defense in cases where 
MDC lawyers were not assigned. The state‟s unwillingness to take responsibility for these costs 
from the counties explains in great part why it took until 1983 to have a consolidated, state-
funded system of indigent defense counsel and assignment. But the SJC‟s ruling nonetheless 
represented a huge stride in the direction of government funding of indigent defense, where 
counties such as Worcester clearly still hoped to divert the expense to the private bar at large. 
Listing the recent Supreme Court decisions that had burdened the state criminal defense system, 
SJC Justice Paul Cashman Reardon all but acceded to the brief filed by the Voluntary Defenders 
Committee calling for a state-funded public defender system devoid of contract attorneys. He 
recalled the bar‟s traditional duty to defend the indigent, and announced, “But times have 
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changed…The regrettably small segment of the bar which has engaged in trial work has 
cheerfully borne the burden of representation of indigents over the years and these lawyers are 
frequently those who are less able to afford that burden than some of their brothers not in trial 
practice. This is inequitable.”34 Reardon and the SJC recommended that nearly all indigent 
criminal cases be appointed to MDC lawyers, a move that pushed Massachusetts one step closer 
to a state-wide system where such attorneys would be salaried government employees, and not 
private practitioners under contract. 
 This response, while comforting to the many who ultimately foresaw a time when 
attorneys no longer had to donate their services to a cause for which government ought to pay, 
meant little without enough financial support for the MDC to expand to meet the state‟s full 
needs. By the end of June, 1968, courts were assigning the Committee 18,128 cases a year, while 
the Commonwealth handled 587,766 criminal cases in that same year.
35
 Not all of these half a 
million cases required the assignment of counsel for an indigent, certainly, but most of those 
accused of criminal activity are poor, and so the vast majority of those cases could have 
benefited from a larger MDC. The MDC‟s staff had also remained nearly the same since July, 
1966, yet new cases received rose 77.8% from then until the end of 1969.
36
 Other problems, such 
as a lack of uniform standards for determining indigency, persisted as well.
37
 Despite predictions 
that the state government would have to fund and manage the criminal indigent defense system, 
the Boston Bar Association would lead much of the charge both in providing legal services for 
the poor, and in advising the legislature on policy with regards to state and national debates 
regarding legal aid.
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Chapter Four 
Public Shortcomings, Private Intervention 
 
By July 1, 1968, the Massachusetts state legislature had appropriated funds sufficient to 
absorb the entirety of the Massachusetts Defenders Committee, including its Suffolk County 
Model Defenders Project, which had formerly received substantial federal funding from the 
Office of Economic Opportunity.
1
 Yet even as the state government advanced further toward 
accepting responsibility for all financing of criminal indigent defense, severe problems existed, 
which the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association, local media, private interest groups, 
and the Boston Bar Association would bring to the public‟s attention. While federal support 
would far from disappear into the 1970s, increasingly it fell to the Bar as a collective 
organization, rather than to its individual members, to conceive, coordinate, and implement new 
strategies to compensate for the system‟s obvious failures. 
In 1968, the Boston Bar Association created its Committee on Legal Services to the 
Indigent to help the Boston Legal Assistance Project, the OEO‟s neighborhood legal office in the 
city, in its efforts to involve private bar members with its work.
2
 By April of that year, the 
Committee reported that the Project was growing, and that the Committee‟s involvement 
stemmed mostly from assigning Committee members to take on cases from the Project.
3
 This 
was far from the Bar‟s first foray into legal aid. Boston Bar members had founded the Boston 
Legal Aid Society in 1900,
4
 and the Association itself had provided early funding for the 
                                                 
1
 Edgar A. Rimbold, “Public Defender of Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases: „No Tub-Thumping,‟” Boston Bar 
Journal 14, no.7 (1970): 11, http://heinonline.org. 
2
 Jones, Discovering the Public Interest, 119. The Committee was often alternatively referred to as the Committee 
on Legal Services to the Poor in Boston Bar Association publications. 
3
 “Committee Reports: Legal Services to the Indigent,” Boston Bar Journal 12, no. 6 (1968): 19, 
http://heinonline.org. 
4
 Greater Boston Legal Services, last visited April 7, 2011, http://www.communityroom.net/NPOBackground. 
asp?140. 
47 
 
Voluntary Defenders Committee in the 1930s,
5
 had formed the Boston Bar Foundation to pay for 
the defense of alleged Communist subversives whom no one else would defend in the 1950s,
6
 
and had provided pro bono services through its Boston Lawyers for Housing program in the mid-
1960s.
7
 In addition, when the various legal support organizations could not handle the deluge of 
indigent cases needing assignment following Rule 10, its amendments, and Gideon, it usually fell 
to Boston Bar members to stem the tide. 
Thus, the Bar‟s support of the neighborhood office was an expected consequence of 
realizations that were bearing fruit for bar associations across the country. The bar now 
recognized the merits to and the advantages of providing legal services for the poor. Certainly, it 
was a longstanding duty the bar had taken upon itself well before the 1960s, an 
acknowledgement to the lack of real legal access to vast segments of the American population. In 
this regard, the Boston Bar Association‟s programs, especially those that flourished in the 1970s, 
were laudable for their generosity and dedication to improving the lives of the city‟s citizens. But 
there was another component at work: the Bar‟s reputation, and thus that of its constituency, 
benefited from the good publicity such opportunities provided. While an article in the Boston 
Bar Journal noted in 1975 that big city bar associations throughout the nation were enhancing 
their pro bono activity because of such factors as “a leadership sensitive to the problems of the 
city,”8 it was also clear that lawyers, a traditionally reviled professional group in many spheres of 
the U.S.,
9
 stood to gain from the charitable endeavors of a relatively few members of the bar. 
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The real value of the Boston Bar‟s contributions is impossible to fully evaluate without taking 
such considerations into account. 
 Two events of the late 1960s in Boston demonstrated the impact that both local and 
national politics had on the development of criminal and civil indigent law systems in Boston. 
Both would eventually involve the Boston Bar Association. At the local level, a scandal within 
the Dorchester District Court erupted in late 1968 and early 1969. Next to a December 15 
headline announcing a 200% rise in murders in Boston in the last decade, one which politicians 
would ordinarily use to condemn organizations that spent tax dollars on defending accused 
criminals, the Boston Globe published a pair of articles describing a different controversy 
surrounding a deal to build a marina in Dorchester, and the local judge running the 
development.
10
 Judge Jerome P. Troy of the Dorchester Municipal Court was already the center 
of a Globe investigation into the wisdom of and motivation for public funding for the project, 
which began in 1966 and required filling in 23 acres of mud flats and tidelands between Victory 
Road and Tenean Beach. While the Globe pointed out some of the Boston College graduate and 
Word War II veteran‟s vague connections to unseemly real estate dealings in New Hampshire, it 
was not until January, 1969, that it released information suggesting improper assignment of 
counsel for indigent defendants in his courtroom, connected to the marina development. Attorney 
Donald H. Carvin had handled the marina deal for Troy‟s family-owned company, and had also 
received $3,730 ($23,600 in 2011 dollars) in city funds for just twelve days of service as 
assigned counsel in Dorchester Municipal Court, leading to speculation of favoritism by Judge 
Troy.
11
 The article also noted that attorney Keith Vincola received frequent assignments from 
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Troy (for $1800 in 1968). Not only did Vincola‟s mother work as Troy‟s secretary, but his uncle 
was a good friend of Troy, and his grandmother had sold Troy‟s company the Dorchester mud 
flat property for a fraction of what she had paid the state for it. Vincoma even admitted that his 
mother‟s position was the reason Judge Troy handed him so many assignments, though Vincoma 
denied that this compromised his defense skills in any way.
12
 
 The President of the Massachusetts Bar Association suggested an investigation, which the 
Boston city counselor opened. He was aware that after Judge Troy had started assigning 
individual, private counsel in February, 1968 (rather than calling on the Massachusetts Defenders 
Committee), the bill to the city soared to $37,000 dollars, while the Boston Municipal Court‟s 
heavier caseload only cost $18,000.
13
 Troy and the city litigated over the marina site for years to 
come, and Troy himself would come under increasing scrutiny for other alleged misconduct 
during his tenure as judge. But the consequences of the original counsel assignment scandal were 
substantial and demonstrative of the difficulties inherent in translating Gideon into reality. Then-
executive assistant to the mayor Barney Frank announced that the city would not approve 
Dorchester District Court‟s request for $120,000 in appropriations,14 and the city finance 
committee cut the funding by nearly 80% to $25,000 for the following year, citing the court‟s 
switch from private attorneys to the cheaper MDC in the wake of the Troy controversy.
15
 The 
city‟s decision effectively shifted yet more of the cost of indigent criminal defense onto the 
state‟s coffers, while using the power of the purse to placate media and public concerns about the 
conflicts of interest created by Judge Troy‟s backroom dealings. It seemed a win-win. Yet this 
solution also ignored that the MDC was chronically underfunded by the state legislature, 
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meaning that ultimately it would be the poor defendants in Dorchester, with their over-worked, 
underpaid, and often inexperienced public defenders, who would bear the brunt of the budget 
cut. It was this sort of political intrigue that could so easily obscure the real problems facing the 
system. 
 The second event of the late 1960s pertinent to the distribution of indigent legal services 
in Boston began at the national level in 1963. Before his death, President Kennedy sought to 
incorporate the “legal establishment” into the civil rights movement more fully by launching the 
national Lawyers‟ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, which would provide much-needed 
legal services to groups and individuals in the South who were leading the charge.
16
 In 1968, the 
Boston Lawyers‟ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law grew out of this national effort, funded 
in part by a grant from the Ford Foundation, in recognition of the need for such services in 
northern urban areas as well.
17
 Organized by nine attorneys and law professors in Boston, the 
Committee started over 80 projects involving 15 law firms in its first year of existence.
18
 The 
Boston Lawyers‟ Committee would become known for its high-profile and innovative solutions 
to the city‟s most desperate legal needs, with a focus on the poor and minority groups, and would 
eventually be completely funded by local, private entities.
19
 
 In October, 1970, the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee released a special report, based on 18 
months of study in six district courts entitled, “The Quality of Justice in the Lower Criminal 
Courts of Metropolitan Boston.” The report concluded that, “…in determining guilt or 
innocence, a man‟s finances are more important than the circumstances surrounding the charge. 
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And ultimately, money determines the final disposition.”20 The findings were blunt and 
upsetting, but not shocking. While the report did receive national acclaim and did lead to a grant 
for the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee to create a Criminal Justice Panel to recruit local firms in the 
drafting of the “first set of comprehensive rules of criminal procedure ever proposed for the 
district courts,”21 its recommendations were little different from past calls to action. Increase 
funding for the MDC, and promote more participation in criminal indigent defense from the 
private bar. The first part of this solution seemed as unlikely as ever, as the MDC budget in 1969 
was $820,000, with requested appropriations of $1.2 million for 1970. Its staff was a mere 60 
lawyers whose annual salary started at $6,800 ($43,000 in 2011 dollars) and averaged between 
$7,500 and $8,000.
22
 Such salaries were far too low to draw in talented attorneys, assuring that 
poor defendants often received young, unseasoned lawyers. Even if the MDC did receive its 
requested budget increase, the Supreme Judicial Court had again amended Rule 10 (now referred 
to as Rule 3:10) in spring, 1969, mandating that indigents in every case be assigned MDC 
lawyers in all but “exceptional circumstances.”23 This was certain to add to a caseload already 
stressed by the rising crime rate that hit the most urban centers in the country beginning in 
1964.
24
 
In fact, by the early 1970s, criminal indigent defense was clearly in critical condition in 
the Commonwealth. By 1971, the Massachusetts Defenders Committee‟s caseload was almost 
40,000; it had been able to expand its staff by just two, to 62 attorneys, and the budget stood just 
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below $1.1 million, lower than the Committee‟s request for the previous year.25 The MDC turned 
to the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association (NLADA) for an evaluation, which offered 
over one hundred recommended changes for the beleaguered state agency.
26
 By August, 1972, 
the Massachusetts Defenders had withdrawn from most of the district courts, no longer able to 
competently represent the poor defendants there. In light of this, Justice Paul Murphy of the 
West Roxbury Court sent a letter to the office of the Boston Bar Association Executive Director 
requesting help in finding more private attorneys to take cases. Murphy expressed doubt that the 
public defenders of MDC could ever accommodate his court‟s needs anyway.27 
The Boston Bar Association had not been an idle spectator to these breakdowns in the 
city and state systems. During the scandal in the 1969 Dorchester Municipal Court, Boston Bar 
President Theodore Chase told the Boston Globe that one of the attorneys in question, Donald 
Carvin, appeared to be “receiving appointments because he has a special relation with the judge,” 
and declared, “It sounds to me highly improper.”28 In the February edition of the Boston Bar 
Journal, he also commended the work of the Boston Herald-Traveler and the Boston Globe for 
uncovering what he identified as “cronyism,” as opposed to Judge Troy‟s explanation of 
assigning private counsel due to the inability of the MDC to take enough cases.
29
 President 
Chase‟s disapproval of Judge Troy‟s conduct was sincere, but so was, undoubtedly, his concern 
for the image that Carvin had portrayed for his fellow city attorneys; Carvin was a member of the 
Boston Bar Association, after all. The Bar had also been watching the ongoing struggles of the 
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Massachusetts Defenders Committee, and had called for additional funding and staff for the 
group in May, 1972.
30
 Out of concern for both the ailing legal services system in the city of 
Boston and its own prestige, the Boston Bar Association in 1973 began to take a far more 
assertive role in the response to the growing legal needs of the city‟s poor communities. 
After over a year of deliberation, on May 10, 1973, the Boston Bar Council voted in 
favor of the Association creating and administering a “public interest law office,” the goal of 
which would be to either take cases with large numbers of complainants (class action lawsuits, in 
some instances), or which had the potential to effect major policy change, especially on behalf of 
the poor and minority groups.
31
 The Bar did not intend to build this office from scratch, but to 
subsume the operations of the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, which 
already had similar objectives. The Lawyers‟ Committee stood to benefit from the reputation and 
publicity of the Bar, the talents of its members, and a new funding source. As the Boston Bar 
Association announced in its Journal, its initiative with the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee was a 
milestone: 
So far as we are aware, the action by the Council [in creating the public  
interest law office] makes Boston the first major city bar association which  
has accepted a professional and financial commitment to further the  
implementation of the principles of due process and equal justice under law  
by representation of otherwise underrepresented persons and groups in cases  
having a public significance beyond the interests of the immediate parties.
32
 
 
The Boston Bar itself would provide $25,000 in annual financing, another $30,000 would come 
from Association members, and other private benefactors added $12,400.
33
 During a pilot period 
of three years beginning September 30, 1973, a Steering Committee of lawyers from firms and 
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law professors would run the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee and determine its exact relationship 
with the Association. The office would place particular emphasis on drawing from the expertise 
of private law firms and practitioners in Boston to achieve its goals, rather than handling cases 
on its own. Its small staff of a few lawyers, volunteers, and law students would only complete 
preliminary work before passing a case along to an attorney with a private firm.
34
 
The speed and muscle private organizations showed in comparison to the shortcomings of 
the Massachusetts Defenders Committee speak less to ideological debates about the comparative 
advantages of the public and private sector responses to society‟s needs than to the nature of the 
services they provided. Like the Boston Legal Aid Society before them, the Boston Legal 
Assistance Project (the OEO-funded neighborhood office) and the now Boston Bar-affiliated 
Lawyers‟ Committee catered almost exclusively to the civil legal problems of their clientele. The 
MDC still had the ever-vilified responsibility to the criminal defendant. That said, the work of 
the neighborhood offices and the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee was impressive. The Assistance 
Project comprised eight neighborhood offices by 1972, representing 14,000 clients with a staff of 
nearly fifty attorneys and an annual $1,001,678 budget from the OEO.
35
 This meant that while it 
had twelve less attorneys than the MDC, and a far more reasonable caseload that was barely over 
a third of the MDC‟s, it still received nearly the same amount in funding. Their 1972 caseload 
was, “consumer matters, 15%; administrative matters (including welfare), 18%; housing matters, 
36%; family matters, 21%; and miscellaneous matters (including juvenile), 11%.”36 Its close 
relationship with the Boston Legal Aid Society flourished as well, as most of the Project‟s board 
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of directors was nominated by the Society.
37
 For its own part, the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee 
had grown at a fantastic pace since its foundation in 1968, having undertaken 400 projects by 
November 1, 1972, with the participation of over 200 lawyers from 25 local firms.
38
 The only 
major recent improvement that the Massachusetts Defenders Committee could report was the 
addition of a Social Service Unit, through which it assessed and referred candidates to 
appropriate social welfare agencies.
39
 
While the vast majority of organized, private efforts went to the civil legal problems 
encountered by the poor, the Boston Bar Association also tried to address the needs of indigent 
criminal defendants, though on a smaller and less publicized scale. In addition to urging its 
members to participate in the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee‟s Criminal Justice Panel,40 the 
Association also began running the Boston Municipal Court Program for Indigent Defendants 
(PID) in 1974.
41
 This service attempted to administer the assigned counsel system currently in 
effect in the city‟s district court (necessitated by the MDC‟s inability to handle all of the cases,42 
rather than as a result of the “cronyism” displayed by Judge Troy in Dorchester) more efficiently. 
PID kept a list of about 200 attorneys‟ names, calling upon three per week to be present at 
arraignment proceedings and to be assigned for trial, need be.
43
 The Association paid these 
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lawyers from its own funds, in accordance with the rules laid out in SJC Rule 3:10, which had by 
now standard rates of compensation for indigent defense counsel. 
The Boston Bar Association also contributed in a less anticipated fashion when it began 
its Marginally Indigent Defendant‟s Attorneys program (MIDA) in early 1974. The program was 
to, “…provide for court-referred counsel for those accused [in Boston Municipal Court] whose 
income falls between that of persons adjudged indigent and those fully able to afford counsel.”44 
To be deemed indigent, one generally had to be receiving state welfare of some kind, or have 
income and assets below certain levels. Many people did not fall within this category, but still 
could not divert savings toward the cost of an attorney. Thus, MIDA represented a stunning 
admission that it was not just the destitute who were unable to afford the services of a criminal 
defense attorney in Boston, but even those with some means had to forgo such services, to their 
detriment in court. MIDA placed caps on attorneys‟ fees: $100 maximum for misdemeanors, and 
$150 maximum for felonies, not including other expenses. By February, 1974, 65 attorneys had 
already offered to take part in the program, and it was running by the first of March.
45
 
That same year, legal assistance programs drafted and had the state legislature enact what 
came to be called the Indigent Court Costs Law, which added Sections 27A through 27G to 
chapter 261 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth. The law was a, “comprehensive statute 
that [required] or [permitted] courts to waive or pay certain court costs of indigent persons.”46 In 
effect, the law provided access to courts that many had lacked previously due to prohibitively 
high court filing and extra fees, such as having to pay the court to subpoena a party to a lawsuit. 
This, combined with the remarkable progress of the various private and Boston Bar-promoted 
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ventures, denoted a large leap forward for the right to counsel in Boston in the early 1970s. 
Innovative solutions brought hope that society could surmount the recurrent setbacks to equal 
access to the law in a country that so prided itself in its justice system. But lest Boston forget its 
debt to the federal funds that still poured in, national politics would again dominate the legal 
playing field in Massachusetts in the form of President Richard Nixon, and his desire to 
discontinue the Office of Economic Opportunity in favor of a different arrangement.
58 
 
Chapter Five 
The Muscle of the Bar 
 
As the national legal services movement spread throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, 
focused primarily on civil legal needs, opposition grew as well. Despite the fact that criminal 
indigent defense had been left to the states to finance and administer (except in the federal 
courts), civil lawsuits often had broad and long-lasting impacts on major policy decisions 
traditionally not under the judiciary‟s purview. As noted above, California Governor Ronald 
Reagan gained national attention when he voiced vitriolic concern about the California Rural 
Legal Assistance program‟s willingness to represent migrant farmers.1 Conservative leaders and 
politicians across the country denounced what they referred to as “poverty lawyers,” and were 
extremely critical of federal funding for initiatives such as the Boston Legal Assistance Project, 
financed by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). As one author summarized, “The 
attacks were usually phrased as objections that nonindigents were being represented, that 
prohibited criminal-defense representation was being provided, or that undue emphasis was 
being given to law reform.”2 This last political point weighed especially heavily on the public 
conscience. Opponents perceived a radical, social reform-minded contingent leading the legal 
services movement, contrary to laws established or opinions held by duly elected officials in 
state legislatures and in Congress. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew identified the movement as, “a 
systemic effort to redistribute societal advantages and disadvantages, penalties and rewards, 
rights and resources.”3 Worse, via the Legal Services Program of the OEO, such efforts to 
                                                 
1
 Neubauer, Judicial Process, 149. 
2
 Katz, Poor People’s Lawyers, 76. 
3
 Kris Shepard, Rationing Justice: Poverty Lawyers and Poor People in the Deep South, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State Univ. Press, 2007), 104. 
59 
 
undermine the will of the people as expressed by their legislative representatives were financed 
by the federal executive. 
 The ideological debate extended to the President himself, as during his second 
administration Richard M. Nixon appointed Howard Phillips, a staunch detractor from any sort 
of federal funding for legal aid, to head and essentially dismantle the OEO for its alleged 
political deviance.
4
 His appointment highlighted the fundamental problem with the Legal 
Services Program: its position in the executive branch left it too susceptible to political 
wrangling. Much as local controversy had thwarted any rational solution to the problems of 
indigent defense in Judge Troy‟s court in Dorchester, national conflict over poverty lawyers‟ 
representation in cases involving abortion, school desegregation and busing, and those against 
government law enforcement agencies,
5
 repeatedly interfered with OEO policy decisions. 
Congress recognized the need to remove federal funding of legal services from such political 
obstructions in order to preserve access to justice for all U.S. citizens. 
 Out of this realization, Congress proposed a bill in 1971 for the establishment of an 
independent, federally-funded, non-profit corporation, “…for the purpose of providing financial 
support for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially unable 
to afford legal assistance.”6 The Legal Services Corporation would be the successor to the OEO 
Legal Services Program, continuing funding for the neighborhood offices that offered civil 
representation throughout the country. The final version of the act passed by Congress 
proclaimed, “…to preserve its strength, the legal services program must be kept free from the 
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influence of or use by it of political pressures.”7 The very process of passing the Legal Services 
Corporation Act demonstrated the need for the Corporation‟s independence: three years of 
political argument, proposed amendments, and Presidential vetoes and veto threats blocked 
passage until 1974, when Nixon was in the throes of the Watergate scandal. Clashes ensued over 
whether the President should be able to appoint the entire board of the nonprofit without 
confirmation of interest groups such as NLADA, and over the so-called Green Amendments, 
which outlawed national support centers such as the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, 
and banned poverty lawyers receiving federal funds from lobbying or taking cases for abortion or 
draft dodgers.
8
 On July 25, 1974, a compromise finally passed, giving board appointments to the 
President, leaving the back-up centers intact, and restricting some sorts of cases that poverty 
lawyers could take.
9
 President Nixon resigned two weeks later. 
 The Boston Bar Association followed these developments intently, and speculated as to 
the consequences of the Nixon administration‟s desire to curtail if not eliminate federal spending 
on neighborhood offices. In January, 1973, Association President John G. Brooks asked, “Will 
there be a new Legal Services Corporation to replace OEO as the sponsoring and funding 
agency... Will cases against governmental departments or agencies be forbidden? Will the Legal 
Services Programs, including the Boston Legal Assistance Project with its forty or so lawyers, its 
13,000 clients per year, and its million dollar budget, be spun off to be supported by local states 
or communities, with or without substantial support from more or less matching funds from 
revenue sharing?”10 While the Committee on Legal Services to the Indigent labeled passage of 
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the Legal Services Corporation Act “essential,”11 it was clear the bill was not ideal in the eyes of 
all Boston Bar members. The Boston Lawyers Committee, newly a part of the Boston Bar 
structure, feared that the bill would seriously alter the functioning of the Boston Legal Aid 
Society, which by 1975 was preparing to merge with the federally-funded Boston Legal 
Assistance Project. The LSC Act would limit the merged Society‟s prior freedom in cases 
pertaining to desegregation, abortions, and draft dodgers.
12
 Boston Bar member and indigent 
legal services advocate David Rideout also referenced the Green Amendments‟ possible effects 
on Boston when he wrote that the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, one of the back-up 
centers the Amendment would have eliminated, provided, “research, training and technical 
support to legal services attorneys and public defenders in Massachusetts.”13 The apparent aid 
this center provided to criminal defendants was exactly what was fueling conservative claims 
about the improprieties of the legal services movement, which they thought should only apply to 
poor civil litigants. As Boston itself was home to the National Consumer Law Center and the 
Center for Law and Education,
14
 the city was fortunate that this portion of the Green 
Amendments did not pass. 
Despite these uncertainties, the Legal Services Corporation still represented a major 
victory in removing legal services from the political arena as much as possible. It was also 
preferable to completely defunded OEO. In May, 1974, Bar President Brooks accorded his 
Association partial responsibility for the bill awaiting Nixon‟s signature, claiming that the 
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current compromise was largely the doing of the organized bar.
15
 At least one author has been 
less kind to the bar, claiming that the American Bar Association cast aside its traditionally 
conservative cloak to support the Legal Services Corporation Act because, “So long as the 
structure of LSPs [Legal Services programs/neighborhood offices] would segregate the poor to a 
specialized caste of lawyers for service, it would leave the bulk of the profession unaffected… 
Opposition to LSPs by the organized bar was stimulated by economic self-interest at the local 
level.”16 Self-interest surely played a part, but given the Boston Bar‟s recent strides in taking 
over the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee and establishing MIDA, this treatment seems harsh, at 
least for the Boston context. The Association‟s next moves in response to the failures of the 
Massachusetts Defenders Committee would tend to bolster this view. 
 In the years immediately following the establishment of the Legal Services Corporation, 
the Massachusetts Defenders Committee made multiple efforts at reform, based largely on the 
recommendations of the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association‟s 1971 evaluation. By 
April 1976, these included, “the establishment of training programs, the development of new 
management systems, the reduction of caseloads, improved supervisory techniques, the 
establishment of neighborhood offices, the reorganization of its Appeals Division, and the 
development of Social Service and Investigative Units for support.”17 The MDC had helped 
begin the Roxbury Defenders Committee as well, which relied on federal funds to provide 
defense to indigent Roxbury residents in the perpetually busy Roxbury District Court and in the 
Suffolk County Superior Court.
18
 Federal funds also enabled the creation of MDC neighborhood 
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offices across the state,
19
 despite the LSC Act‟s limitation to civil legal services. In addition, the 
Defenders Committee initiated programs to engage private firm attorneys and local laws school 
students in helping MDC attorneys with indigent defense cases.
20
 MDC‟s Appeals Division 
engaged in legislative review and drafting, and its Social Service Unit referred 113 clients to 
over 170 programs in just the last six months of 1975.
21
 The MDC‟s overall staff had grown to 
197, 120 of whom were attorneys, and in 1975 it represented 22,848 defendants in the district 
courts, and 5,425 in the superior courts.
22
 
 This apparent progress, however, fell well short of the mark, resulting in increased 
intervention by the Boston Bar Association. To be sure, state appropriations to the MDC had 
risen from $1.1 million in 1971 to $1.92 million in 1976, and the Committee received over a 
million more dollars in federal grants for its various programs.
23
 Its staff attorneys had doubled 
in that same time period as well. But while implementing the recommendations of NLADA may 
have improved the MDC‟s services for its clients, it decreased the number of people able to avail 
themselves of the Defender Committee‟s representation. The major recommendation, to 
significantly reduce caseloads in order to ensure that defendants received competent counsel that 
was not over-worked, and that the MDC could raise salaries to attract better lawyers, had some 
undesirable results. Starting attorney salaries may have risen from $6,800 in 1970 to $11,570 in 
1976,
24
 but when adjusted for inflation, this only amounted to a 16% raise over six years, still not 
enough to entice talented law school graduates. Instead, the doubling of the staff accounted for 
most of the increased budget over this period, as opposed to higher attorney salaries. More 
                                                 
19
 Ibid, 31. 
20
 Ibid, 32. 
21
 Ibid, 33. 
22
 Ibid, 30. 
23
 Ibid, 34. 
24
 Ibid, 29. 
64 
 
importantly, the dramatic drop in caseload from 40,000 in 1971 to about 28,000 in 1975 meant 
that the MDC was “able to handle only 30% of the indigent defendants in the district courts, 90% 
in the Superior Court, and 50% in the appellate courts, and still provide effective and quality 
representation.”25 The MDC‟s new programs indicated better services, and the reduced number 
of defendants taken led to more manageable caseloads for the MDC lawyers, but all at the 
expense of those who were not fortunate enough to take part. The other 70% at the district court 
level had to rely on the court-appointed counsel system, which was generally more expensive, 
and the funding for which still fell either to private defender programs or on the counties. 
 The Boston Bar Association began to significantly increase its involvement in providing 
legal services to the poor during the mid-1970s. In May, 1974, the Bar raised its membership 
dues in order to help fund its “public interest law office,” which kept the name Boston Lawyers 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Indicative of the changing attitude of the lawyers in the 
city, the Bar only suffered insignificant losses in membership, despite the dues increase.
26
 The 
Bar‟s Committee on Legal Services for the Indigent expanded to fifteen members by July, 
1974,
27
 and in February, 1975, the Boston Bar Council used the Bar Journal to reminded city 
lawyers of their “individual duty” to provide pro bono representation to the poor as outlined in 
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
28
 Thus, the objectives of the legal services movement 
seemed to have pervaded the attorney community in Boston, from the few individual reformers 
of the late fifties and early sixties to the leading Bar members by 1975. 
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 In the criminal defense context, the Boston Bar Association‟s Marginally Indigent 
Defendants‟ Attorneys program (MIDA) flourished in the mid-1970s. Within a few months of its 
establishment in the Boston Municipal Court with the support of Chief Judge Jacob Lewiton, 
over a hundred attorneys had offered their services.
29
 By July, 1975, four other district courts in 
Boston had adopted the program, and the Boston Bar Association was serving as an advisor for 
other counties in the city and across the country that wished to implement their own versions.
30
 
While MIDA was an initial success because it allowed lawyers to serve the public interest while 
still receiving some compensation, and because it was less costly to the taxpayer than referring 
the cases to the MDC or to county defender programs,
31
 problems persisted. Just over half of the 
“marginally indigent” defendants were able to pay the reduced fees,32 and because “virtually the 
entire metropolitan Boston area”33 qualified for the program, it is not surprising that the Boston 
Bar chose to use law school students to help MIDA attorneys with their workload.
34
 By 1980, the 
MIDA program would be far less active as, “defendants [were] for the most part found to be 
indigent or not,”35 and the program petered out not long after amid calls for greater state 
involvement in the criminal defense of indigents. 
 In the civil arena, however, the Boston Bar truly began to shine following the passage of 
the Legal Services Corporation Act. In 1976, the Bar‟s Committee on Legal Services for the 
Indigent had expanded to over thirty members, and actively lobbied Congress for the repeal of 
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the Green Amendments.
36
 The Boston Lawyers‟ Committee meanwhile sought to challenge a 
recent First Circuit decision denying indigent criminal defendants a free transcript of their 
probable cause hearings, petitioned the SJC for guidelines to limit police brutality,
37
 and received 
a funding extension of three years from the Bar.
38
 As the Boston Legal Assistance Project and 
the Boston Legal Aid Society, long connected in ambition and administration, merged into 
Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS) in 1976,
39
 the Boston Bar Association saw the 
completion of its most enduring and influential project during the legal services movement: 
Action Plan for Legal Services. Begun in winter of 1974-1975 under the sponsorship of the 
Boston Bar Association and the Boston Bar Foundation and published in January, 1977, the 
Plan‟s purpose was, “to review the entire scope of legal needs of the poor in the City of Boston, 
including criminal, civil and juvenile matters, to catalog present resources for delivery of legal 
services and resources for funding of legal services, to determine the specific areas of legal needs 
of the poor in different neighborhoods of Boston…”40 The first part published in 1977 focused 
on civil legal needs, while the second dealt with criminal matters and was released in June, 
1978.
41
 The Plan‟s findings provided a thorough cross-section of the legal situation of the poor in 
Boston at this time, as it noted that, “The need for legal help greatly exceeds the available 
services…Due to severe financial constraints, legal services have declined in quantity and 
scope…Greater Boston Legal Services, the main provider of legal services to Boston‟s poor, is 
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seriously underfunded…The Private Bar represents a large untapped resource.”42 Action Plan 
documented over 12,000 civil legal problems recognized by the poor in Boston in 1975, of which 
publicly-funded counsel served less than a third, and private counsel under 10%, meaning that 
more than half of the civil legal needs that the indigent recognized that year went 
unrepresented.
43
 Despite this apparent need, in the nine years preceding the study‟s publication 
Greater Boston Legal Services had contracted from eleven neighborhood offices to six, and had 
lost an average of thirteen lawyers each, while those remaining were still underpaid.
44
 Yet the 
two-year study also found “substantial interest and willingness to provide pro bono services” 
among lawyers in Boston firms,
45
 and recommended greater involvement of the private bar in the 
provision of civil legal services to the poor. 
 The Boston Bar Committee on Legal Services for the Indigent had stated in 1975 that 
Action Plan for Legal Services was the first comprehensive study and proposal of its kind in any 
U.S. urban area,
46
 and the Bar followed up on the Plan promptly after its publication in 1977. 
While some later articles in the Boston Bar Journal would proclaim the Volunteer Lawyers 
Project a direct result of Action Plan for Legal Services, an August, 1976 Legal Services 
Corporation invitation to bar associations and other groups nationwide to submit proposals for 
how best to provide legal services to the poor was the real origin of the Project.
47
 In December of 
that year, the Boston Bar Association‟s proposal to the LSC won it a $110,000 grant to create the 
Volunteer Lawyers Project, run by two attorneys, two paralegals, and two support staff.
48
 Action 
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Plan may not have caused the Bar to form the VLP,
49
 but, “The pro bono model [for the VLP] 
was selected because of the findings of the Action Plan for Legal Services.”50 The VLP thus 
became the Boston Bar‟s mechanism for implementing Action Plan‟s recommendation that more 
private bar attorneys, many of whom had expressed interest in such work, take on the civil legal 
cases of Boston‟s poor. The panel of attorneys the VLP maintained and called on numbered 220 
in February when it first began operations, 300 by April, and over 350 by July, 1977, each 
accepting up to five civil cases a year on a pro bono basis.
51
 It was clear that the Volunteer 
Lawyers took their responsibility under Action Plan seriously, as nearly every publication of 
theirs in the Boston Bar Journal called for more bar members to volunteer in the hopes of 
reaching 700-800 for the panel. Such numbers could certainly go far to cover the half of the 
12,000 indigent legal needs Action Plan listed as unmet in 1975. 
 Despite these advances in civil legal services, more burdens on the Massachusetts 
indigent defense system arrived in 1978. Superior Court Rule 65 became effective January 1, and 
provided that unless the presiding judge specifically allowed it, a defendant‟s counsel must stay 
with her client from the trial level and throughout the appeals process in the superior courts. 
Moreover, Rule 65 required attorneys of indigent defendants to file a, “motion for appointment 
of substitute counsel,” and that a court clerk inform a defendant of his right to appeal.52 Stephen 
Hrones, a Fulbright winner to France in comparative law and a Michigan Law School graduate, 
predicted in the Boston Bar Journal, “This rule change should affect the practice of a significant 
portion of the criminal bar that had in the past dropped the case after trial, either because they 
                                                 
49
 The VLP was actually mentioned by name in Action Plan for Legal Services, and thus must have preceded it. 
50
 Ibid, 9. 
51
 “Committee Reports: Volunteer Lawyers Project,” Boston Bar Journal 22, no. 5 (1978): 7, http://heinonline.org. 
Joseph W. Bartlett, “The President‟s Page,” Boston Bar Journal 21, no. 3, (1977): 3, http://heinonline.org. 
52
 Stephen Hrones, “The Appeal of a Criminal Case to the Appellate Courts in Massachusetts,” Boston Bar Journal 
23, no. 5 (1979): 6, http://heinonline.org. 
69 
 
were not paid to do the appeal, did not want to do it, or did not know how to do it…”53 Such a 
rule was likely to strain the Massachusetts Defenders Committee‟s supply of attorneys, as well as 
its capacity to train its attorneys for appellate criminal defense. The state received another 
challenge that year in the form of an amendment to General Law ch. 213, § 8, “The Allowance 
for Accounts,” which had been at issue in the Abodeely case before the Supreme Judicial Court 
in 1967. The 1978 amendment, “provided that payments under this section [which would go to 
lawyers in assigned counsel cases, as opposed to MDC] should be made out of the state treasury 
rather than by the county treasuries.”54 This marked another transition in the long road from the 
county-funded to the state-funded public defense system in Massachusetts, as the counties of the 
Commonwealth still paid for a third of the cost of indigent defense cases in 1978.
55
 The state was 
one step closer to a consolidated, state-financed indigent defense program on the books, but 
remained dependant on the organized bar for providing attorneys. This change came just in time; 
within two years, Proposition 2½ passed, stating that, “The total taxes assessed within any city or 
town under the provisions of this chapter shall not exceed two and one-half per cent of the full 
and fair cash valuation in said city or town in any fiscal year.”56 This initiative made it 
significantly more difficult for the counties to continue funding for local court costs, including 
administration expenses, judge and clerk salaries, and paying public defenders. Rule 65, the 1978 
amendment, and Prop 2½ all pointed to the need for state government intervention in the funding 
of Massachusetts‟ judiciary, including indigent defense. 
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 Equally important, this transition did not alter the fact that federal funding and discourse 
still dictated, to an extent, what happened at the local level. The Boston Bar Association was 
becoming known as a national leader in innovative answers to the problems presented by the 
legal services movement (its Boston Lawyers‟ Committee and Volunteer Lawyers Project 
quickly coming to the forefront) but the Boston Bar‟s efforts, too, were dependent on the 
activities in Washington. In January, 1978, the VLP received its second federal grant from the 
Legal Services Corporation, for $142,267, which helped its ever-necessary expansion.
57
 Greater 
Boston Legal Services clearly relied on funding from LSC, just as the Boston Legal Assistance 
Project had relied on Office of Economic Opportunity funds, and a two-year, $38,269 grant from 
LSC also made possible the Boston Bar‟s next legal services undertaking: the Law Firm 
Resources Project. Unlike VLP, the Resources Project was the direct result of Action Plan for 
Legal Services recommendations.
58
 It had two main objectives: “1 to match Greater Boston 
Legal Services neighborhood offices with private law firms for the provision of comprehensive 
support services including consultation on litigation and specialized substantive law areas; and 2 
to create several mechanisms through which private-sector paralegals can do pro bono work.”59 
Local foundations provided 50% matching funds for the Resources Project, local firms Palmer & 
Dodge followed by Warner & Stackpole housed it, and the Project began operations in January, 
1979.
60
 The hope was that pairing the GBLS neighborhood offices with large law firms would 
greatly increase the offices‟ access to expensive legal materials such as libraries, computers, 
paralegals, and litigation advice from big firm attorneys, with relatively little cost to the firms 
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themselves. The Law Firm Resources Project, in conjunction with the Volunteer Lawyers 
Project, also recruited and set up a panel of paralegals interested in doing pro bono legal work. 
Initially, the Resources Project paired four large law firms with GBLS offices in Boston, and 
recruited forty paralegals.
61
 
 Thus, by 1978 the Boston Bar Association had three main growing organizations devoted 
to providing legal services to Boston‟s poor under its wing: the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee, a 
part of the Bar since 1973, the Volunteer Lawyers Project, established in 1977, and the new Law 
Firm Resources Project, which collaborated with the VLP, local firms, and GLBS. All of these 
groups shared the same basic goals in the late 1970s and early 1980s, of which Action Plan for 
Legal Services was the best and most well-known expression. During this period, the 
overlapping nature of these associations‟ work, the trend toward state funding of criminal 
indigent defense, and the prerogatives of the Reagan administration led to the creation of the 
modern Committee for Public Counsel Services in 1983.
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Chapter Six 
Consolidation 
 
“With the likelihood of serious cut-backs in federally-funded legal services programs, the 
private bar, through programs such as the Law Firm Resources Project, will have an increasingly 
important role in delivering legal services to the poor.”1 This dire July, 1981 prediction from the 
Law Firm Resources Project reflected how yet again events in the nation‟s capital determined the 
state of the indigent legal service system in Boston. Former California Governor Ronald Reagan 
had won the 1980 presidential election, and his views on “poverty lawyers” had not changed. To 
be sure, his disdain for this sector of government spending was part of an overall ideology that 
promoted private charity over federal funding, Christian giving over bureaucratic decision-
making. In October, 1981, Reagan addressed the National Alliance of Business: 
With the same energy that Franklin Roosevelt sought public solutions to  
problems, we will seek private solutions. The challenge before us is to find ways  
once again to unleash the independent spirit of the people and their communities.  
That energy will accomplish far, far more than government programs ever could...  
In the days following World War II when a war-ravaged world could have  
slipped back into the Dark Ages, Pope Pius XII said the American people have a  
genius for great and unselfish deeds. Into the hands of America, God has placed  
an afflicted mankind. Let those words be true of us today…2 
 
Yet the President also harbored a particular animosity toward those in the legal services 
movement, and he explicitly sought to defund the Legal Services Corporation, going well 
beyond President Nixon‟s actions with regards to the Office of Economic Opportunity. Before 
even his inauguration, Reagan seemed to call for, “the abolition of federally funded legal 
services to the poor,”3 and his words were taken as evidence of a desire to dismantle the LSC and 
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all those organizations that would sue government agencies.
4
 While these efforts would 
ultimately fail, the scare to the legal services community definitely put consolidation of indigent 
legal representation onto the fast-track in the Commonwealth. 
 Interestingly, the Boston legal organization whose agenda would have been most likely to 
upset the President was actually funded by private donors alone: the Boston Lawyers‟ 
Committee. The Committee was easily the most radical of the legal service providers in Boston 
at its time, in keeping with its philosophy of using the law to create social change. Located at 204 
Washington Street, it received $55,000 in funds from Boston firms, $25,000 from the Boston 
Bar, and another $5,000 from individuals in 1977.
5
 Cases had to involve a, “civil rights or 
poverty law issue…class action and/or reform potential…could not be pursued without pro bono 
representation,” and were referred to any of approximately twenty participating law firms for 
litigation (the Committee litigated very few cases on its own).
6
 Typical cases even into the early 
1980s were inflammatory both in subject matter and scope. Lawsuits over racial violence and job 
discrimination were common, as in one case the Committee represented a black truck driver 
whose vehicle had been stoned by white youths in South Boston, and who had subsequently been 
fired from his job.
7
 The Lawyers‟ Committee also took contentious desegregation cases, and 
frequently sued state and federal agencies, such as the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), for 
discriminatory or improper distribution of services or benefits. Particularly controversial cases 
were Castro v. Beecher and NAACP v. Beecher, which dealt with discriminatory testing 
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procedures in Boston Police and Fire Department hiring practices. As the Boston Lawyers‟ 
Committee noted in one committee report: “These past procedures had resulted in blacks 
constituting only 3 (or .9%) of the over 300 superior officers (above the rank of patrol officers), 
whereas they are 5.5% of the force and over 20% of the population.”8 The 1978 class actions 
resulted in consent decrees for the BPD and the BFD to change their testing processes, but 
further strife erupted when budget cuts led to lay-offs of the most recently hired employees: 
mostly the African-Americans who had been hired as a result of court order. In spring, 1983, the 
Boston Lawyers‟ Committee saved the jobs of over 300 minority police and fire department 
employees before the U.S. Supreme Court. The Reagan administration had filed an amicus brief 
opposing the Committee‟s stance.9 Even the privately funded Lawyers‟ Committee felt 
threatened by the influence of the Reagan White House, declaring that just enforcing already-
won consent decrees was, “an important example of one task confronted by civil rights and law 
reform offices in the 1980‟s: to ensure that various decrees and orders obtained a decade or so 
ago are properly implemented and that intended changes are realized.”10 
 If the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee was an unreachable aggravation to the Reagan 
mentality, the Volunteer Lawyers Project was more readily managed. The VLP had been one of 
38 organizations nationwide to receive permanent funding from the Legal Services Corporation 
in October, 1979,
11
 and the Boston Bar Association feared the demise of the VLP if Reagan‟s bid 
to defund the LSC were to succeed: “Since the Volunteer Lawyers Project receives 90% of its 
funding from the Legal Services Corporation, the Project would cease to exist if this 
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administration prevails.”12 While the VLP‟s public financing may have been problematic for 
President Reagan‟s vision for American society, the scope of its activities was far less offensive 
than the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee‟s. In fact, Volunteer Lawyers Project attorneys engaged in 
much the same work as those at Greater Boston Legal Services: “Since hard-pressed 
neighborhood legal services [GBLS] offices are unable to provide free legal assistance to all 
those who are eligible, the involvement of private volunteer attorneys [through VLP] is critically 
needed.”13 Thus, VLP contrasted with the Lawyers‟ Committee by meeting the less dramatic but 
equally needed civil legal demands of Boston‟s poor population, in conformity with Action Plan 
for Legal Services. Such demands varied widely, from a new roof for a housing resident who 
was previously subjected to frequent flooding, to reversing on appeal a poor woman‟s denial of 
disability benefits, to naming someone a temporary guardian in order to allow that client to 
authorize emergency surgery for a friend.
14
 Other typical Volunteer Lawyers Project cases were 
writing wills for the poor and sick, maintaining special programs for the elderly, and arguing 
unfair utility bills for impoverished housing residents. A July, 1981 case taken by the VLP 
exemplified how the services of an attorney often had an especially large impact in the lives of 
those who ordinarily could not afford such services. A couple had been making Chapter XIII 
bankruptcy payments for three years when the husband lost his job, and, unable to complete the 
remaining payments, they face dismissal of their Chapter XIII claim. A VLP lawyer saw to it that 
their remaining payments were waived in a complete discharge, a nearly impossible result 
without the aid of a trained attorney.
15
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 The VLP provided many other critical services to the Boston and national community. It 
held educational seminars and gave technical assistance to civil indigent attorneys; published and 
distributed a thousand-page manual entitled “Counseling Low and Moderate Income Clients,”16 
worked closely with the Law Firm Resources Project to create its pro bono paralegal panel;
17
 and 
became a national model for such organizations that bridged the gap between bar associations 
and neighborhood legal offices. Indeed, the VLP Director gave presentations to the Legal 
Services Corporation Board of Directors in 1978,
18
 the VLP provided technical assistance to 
similar groups in Worcester, Chicago, Rochester, Denver, parts of Florida, and to the 
Massachusetts Bar Association in 1979,
19
 and the Project was featured in the National Legal Aid 
and Defenders Association publication as “Pro Bono That Works” in 1980.20 The VLP‟s rise to 
the national spotlight paralleled its internal growth. By July, 1980, the Volunteer Lawyers 
Project had over 700 attorneys committed to accepting as many as five civil cases annually, had 
helped nearly 2,000 clients in 1979, and had provided an estimated $1,500,000 worth of services 
that year.
21
 For its own part, the Law Firm Resources Project had continued to collaborate with 
the VLP on its paralegal panel, and had expanded law firm-GBLS relationships to eight 
neighborhood legal offices.
22
 
 The legal service movement and the Reagan administration butted heads dramatically in 
the capital in the spring of 1981, as tensions over White House threats to eliminate federal 
funding for legal services through the Legal Services Corporation ran high throughout the 
country. In what became known as the “Lawyers‟ March on Washington,” the American Bar 
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Association led a national attempt to save the LSC by coordinating meetings between Congress 
and legal services experts and advocates, culminating on April 1, 1981.
23
 The “gang of eleven” 
came from Boston, coalesced by the Boston Bar Association‟s Ad Hoc Committee to Preserve 
Access to Justice, which included Boston and Massachusetts Bar members, attorneys from major 
firms in Boston, law school deans, and other pro bono providers.
24
 After meeting with 
Massachusetts senators and representatives to lobby against Reagan administration prerogatives 
on legal services, the gang of eleven and the Committee led a huge letter-writing campaign to 
Congress among local lawyers. As the Ad Hoc Committee reported, “These efforts were 
successful in that the elimination proposal was defeated, and LSC, while experiencing a funding 
reduction from $321 million to $241 million, was assured of at least temporary survival.”25 The 
Law Firm Resources Project also declared that its role in creating and improving relationships 
between Boston‟s larger private law firms and the publically-funded neighborhood offices of 
Greater Boston Legal Services contributed to the firms‟ strong advocacy of the LSC in this 
controversy.
26
 Jack Curtin, whom the Boston Bar Association hailed for his efforts to educate 
state politicians on the issue of legal services funding, pointed out in July how important it had 
been to save the LSC, as it provided 90% of VLP‟s funding, and $3,000,000 in financing for 16 
GBLS offices, which handled over 16,500 cases in 1980.
27
 Despite this victory, the 25% 
reduction in LSC‟s funds would take its toll on legal services organizations, and Reagan would 
continue to encourage private solutions over public ones, leaving the LSC‟s fate uncertain during 
his tenure. 
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 The budget cuts to the Legal Services Corporation forced Greater Boston Legal Services 
to reduce its own staff and completely reorganize in order to cope with the decreased funding, 
managing much of its work out of one main office downtown.
28
 In December, 1981, Boston Bar 
President Raymond Young evaluated the situation in stark terms, writing in the Bar Journal that 
20% to 50% of the total need for legal services nationally was simply unmet even before the 
budget cut, and that, “Absent some deus ex machina, the burden falls upon the private bar.”29 His 
hand forced by national politics, Young implemented a plan developed by the Law Firm 
Resources Project, wherein young attorneys at Boston firms would have the opportunity to 
provide services at GBLS offices during 3-6 month, full-time rotations.
30
 While not mandatory, 
Young strongly encouraged twenty-five large law firms to participate, despite the cost of 
continuing to pay their attorneys for hours not billed to firm clients, citing the unanimous support 
of the Boston Bar Council. This drastic solution served as yet another reminder of the difficulties 
of ensuring equal access to justice in Massachusetts, and soon pre-existing calls for the 
legislature to increase funding and provide administrative support to the numerous programs in 
effect would become impossible to ignore. 
 While Boston Bar President Raymond Young did not announce that there was a, “major 
fiscal crisis in the administration of justice in the Commonwealth,”31 until April, 1982, groups 
had cited the increasing need for the state to step in for years. In 1976, the Supreme Judicial 
Court‟s Committee on the Appointment of Competent Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants 
in the district and municipal courts, referred to as the “Wilkins Committee” for Justice Herbert 
Wilkins, marked a first step in the foundation of Massachusetts‟ modern Committee for Public 
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Counsel Services. The Wilkins Committee investigated and recommended the centralization of 
indigent counsel services in the Commonwealth.
32
 In 1977, Action Plan for Legal Services had 
endorsed the creation of a “funding clearinghouse” to allow legal service providers to spend their 
time representing clients, rather than searching for financing.
33
 Even more indicative of the need 
for consolidation, Action Plan had also advocated a “central referral source” because there was 
no, “mechanism…by which agencies are kept informed of other agencies‟ changes (whether 
short-term or permanent) in hours, intake policies or even location.”34 In addition, the criminal 
Action Plan for Legal Services, published in 1978, included a, “proposal to establish a state 
agency or office which would coordinate and advocate for legal services funding and resources 
in state government.”35 Even as it became more and more apparent that the state legislature 
would have to fund legal services in Massachusetts due to such measures as Proposition 2½ and 
the 1978 amendment to Chapter 213 of the General Laws, there was now a clear trend toward 
state organization of the provision of these services. The efforts of the organized bar, 
neighborhood offices, and county bar advocate programs were still unable to meet the legal 
needs of the state‟s poor. Despite the Boston Bar Association‟s impressive body of work through 
the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee, the Volunteer Lawyers Project, and the Law Firm Resources 
Project, in July, 1980, its Committee on Legal Services for the Indigent admitted the need for 
some sort of umbrella entity, a “public or private agency which would be responsive to - and an 
advocate of - the needs of legal services and advocacy program.”36 In March, 1982, the Boston 
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Bar published its own review of the implementation of Action Plan for Legal Services in the city, 
which recommended finding alternate sources of funding for Greater Boston Legal Services, and 
which echoed the original Action Plan goal of a streamlined referral system to help poor clients 
navigate the confusing and overlapping legal services establishments in Boston.
37
 This same 
year, the Boston Bar Association also made clear the toll its own pro bono programs had taken: it 
had spent $60,000, or 15% of its budget, on such endeavors.
38
 Even though the Association won 
a $100,000 permanent grant from the Permanent Charity Fund of Boston for the continuation of 
these services, President Young recognized that the city‟s legal needs would still far outstrip 
anything his Bar Association could muster, and he called on the state legislature to avoid the 
projected two to three million dollar shortfall in legal services appropriations.
39
 
 As President Reagan‟s assault on legal services nationwide continued in the early 1980s, 
the Boston Bar Association increased its legislative lobbying efforts to protect the interests of the 
indigent defendant and litigant. Its Ad Hoc Committee to Preserve Access to Justice maintained 
operations, and the Delivery of Legal Services Section supported the formation of the 
Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corporation (MLAC), the state-level analogue to the federal 
Legal Services Corporation.
40
 Based on a model in use in six other states, MLAC was 
established under Chapter 609 of the Acts of 1982, and channeled state funds from surcharges on 
initial court filings totaling approximately $2.5 million,
41
 marking a significant victory in the 
private bar‟s ability to shift more financial responsibility for indigent legal needs onto the state. 
If the Massachusetts legislature needed any more prompting, Supreme Judicial Court Chief 
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Justice Edward F. Hennessey announced that, “The court seeks the establishment of a state-wide 
agency, appointed by the court, with the responsibility of providing and monitoring criminal 
defense services in a manner both efficient and economical.”42 While the Massachusetts Senate 
Committee on Ways and Means referred to “turf battles” between the various public and private 
agencies already providing legal representation to indigents as an excuse for its inability to create 
an umbrella organization,
43
 Boston Bar President John Perkins declared that the state‟s separate 
appropriation schemes for different legal services providers, “[worked] to perpetuate the problem 
of uneven quality of counsel between bar advocate programs, and loose standards for court-
appointed counsel.”44 By December of 1982, legislation was pending in the state legislature that 
would create a public counsel system incorporating the features (state-funded, independent, and 
largely reliant on its own staff of full-time attorneys) lobbied for by the Boston Bar 
Association.
45
 
 By 1983, the Boston Bar Association seemed to be doing for the public interest as much 
as anyone could have expected of a professional organization. It had increased its donations to 
the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee to $35,000 annually;46 its Volunteer Lawyers Project had the 
original goal of 800 volunteer attorneys from every major law firm in the city;
47
 five firms had 
joined the Law Firm Resources Project‟s rotational program with the GBLS offices;48 it had 
begun a Law School Liaison Committee to incorporate student participation in pro bono work 
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into the curriculum of local schools.
49
 Finally, the Massachusetts state legislature responded with 
Chapter 673 of the Acts of 1983, which created the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(CPCS), codified in Chapter 211D of the Massachusetts General Laws. This was indeed the 
umbrella agency for which so many people and organizations had been advocating for years. 
CPCS, “was established to plan, oversee and coordinate the delivery of criminal and certain non-
criminal legal services by all salaried public counsel, bar advocate and other assigned counsel 
programs and private attorneys serving on a per case basis.”50 A fifteen member committee, 
appointed to three-year terms by the Supreme Judicial Court, headed the organization‟s 100-120 
original full-time staff of public defenders, as well as the contract system by which bar advocate 
programs assigned cases to private counsel.
51
 This system was distinct from the usual contract 
attorney system of assigning counsel, in that it was not the courts who contracted with either 
individual lawyers or groups of lawyers to take cases, but it was a state agency that carried out 
this administrative function. As the foundation of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
which still operates today, marked the final shift from county to state funding of indigent 
criminal defense in Massachusetts, it also denoted the transition from prior judicial control of 
implementing Rule 10 and Gideon into legislative hands. Civil legal needs, however, still rely 
primarily on federal and private funding for their continuation.
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Conclusion 
 
 The CPCS, which remains Massachusetts‟ organizational body in charge of the 
distribution of public counsel, marked not only the final step in transferring the fiscal and 
administrative responsibility for criminal indigent defense to the state, but also the beginning of a 
new period in the legal history of the Commonwealth. Certainly legal services advocates did not 
cease their calls for further reform, nor their efforts to continue to provide civil legal assistance. 
But the distinctive legal services movement that followed Gideon had come to a close in 
Massachusetts by 1983, as the Committee for Public Counsel Services developed an advocacy, 
politic, and history in its own right. The agency would be a vocal and even combative supporter 
of change, often in the face of opposition from the governor or other politicians. It is for these 
reasons that studying the period from Gideon in 1963 to the foundation of CPCS in 1983 makes 
the most sense, since it formed a historically cohesive era. 
 What did that era show us? The interplay between the federal and local actors was the 
most important theme. Federal funding was necessary for many of the legal services programs in 
Massachusetts, but the influence of the federal government clearly went beyond mere budget 
allowances. The U.S. Supreme Court in particular deserved credit for beginning and forcing the 
discourse about the Sixth Amendment and its meaning for the states. The opinions of the Warren 
and Burger Courts had a direct impact on the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court, and while 
the SJC certainly had already begun to expand the rights of the accused with Rule 10 in 1958, the 
current system in Massachusetts would never have come into place without the string of 
precedents from the nation‟s high court. Other examples of national influence varied widely, 
from NLADA recommendations for the Massachusetts Defenders Committee, to Massachusetts 
policy mirroring the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, to the state creating its own miniature 
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Legal Services Corporation, to the vast work of the Johnson administration-inspired 
neighborhood legal offices in Boston, to the leadership provided by the Office of Economic 
Opportunity and the Legal Services Corporation. Even the effects of the actions of Presidents 
Nixon and Reagan that were detrimental to the legal services movement still demonstrated how 
closely national politics and local reform efforts were linked. 
 The 1963-1983 period also showed the diversity of creative solutions to the problem of 
providing quality legal services to the poor that came out of Gideon‟s mandate, and from the 
obligations of Rule 10 in Massachusetts. At the national level the OEO Legal Services Program 
and its successor Legal Services Corporation funded the new neighborhood offices, which 
contrasted starkly with legal aid societies in scope and aim. In Boston, there were almost too 
many organizations, employing different strategies to provide attorneys to indigents. While it 
could never match the output of Greater Boston Legal Services, the programs inspired, 
maintained, or run by the Boston Bar Association offered some of the most innovative answers 
to a problem that often fell to its individual members to resolve. Where the Marginally Indigent 
Defendants‟ Attorneys program helped those who could not quite qualify for Massachusetts 
Defenders Committee representation in the criminal context, civil legal bodies recruited private 
bar members (the Volunteer Lawyers Project) to litigate cases, paired private firms with 
neighborhood offices (the Law Firm Resources Project) to share vital services, or screened and 
began cases that were likely to have broad social policy consequences related to race and poverty 
(the Boston Lawyers‟ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law). All of these improved upon the 
prior modus operandi of judges assigning cases to attorneys on a list, which was usually more 
expensive to the county or state entity picking up the tab. 
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 Boston during the legal services movement thus has much to teach us today, as we 
continue to face the same problems. Throughout the country, funding for indigent defense 
counsel is still inadequate, and the civil legal needs of the poor still go far beyond the resources 
available to them. Unfortunately, competent attorney services are expensive, whether or not they 
are a right, and whether or not it is the government paying for them. Money remains the number 
one obstacle separating the poor from equal access to justice in this country. The problems may 
be the same, but that does not mean past solutions failed, or cannot help today. Despite 
overwhelming odds, given the novelty of Gideon and its demands in the 1960s, the Boston Bar 
Association still managed to drastically increase private bar participation in indigent legal 
services. No matter how comprehensive the CPCS or any public defender system becomes, and 
no matter how effective the LSC‟s recipient organizations are, the need for individual attorneys 
to donate their expertise to this cause will be necessary. If nothing else, the Boston legal services 
movement serves as a reminder of the responsibility lawyers have as professionals to represent 
those who cannot afford a fair trial any other way.
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